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Business Associations and Professions; extension of civil liability
for corporate securities law violations
Corporations Code §§25504.1, 25504.2 (new); §§25506, 25507
(amended).
AB 592 (Knox); STATS 1977, Ch 144
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 144 extends civil liability for specified violations of the Corpo-
rate Securities Law of 1968 [CAL. CORP. CODE §§25000-25804] to any
person who materially assists in such violations with an intent to deceive or
defraud [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.11. In addition, Section 25504.2 of the
Corporations Code, as added by Chapter 144, extends civil liability to
certain professionals, who, with their written consent, have been named as
having prepared or certified specified documents distributed in connection
with the offer or sale of securities, when such documents contain untrue
statements or omissions of material facts and a person acquires the described
securities in reliance on these statements [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2
(a)(1)-(2)] [Sections 25504.1, 25504.2 and 25506 of the Corporations Code
were subsequently amended by Chapter 762 of the Statutes of 1977 without
substantial change to the provisions of these sections. Thus, all future
reference to Sections 25504.1, 25504.2, and 25506 shall be to the Chapter
762 version of these code sections.].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 144, civil liability for violations of the
Corporate Securities Law of 1968 was imposed only on persons who were in
privity with the plaintiff [See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§25501, 25503; 6
B. WrnTN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations §243 (8th ed.
1974)], or persons who controlled the party who was in privity with the
plaintiff [See CAL. CORP. CODE §25504]. A person "in privity with the
plaintiff" as used in this context is defined as being a person from whom the
plaintiff purchased or to whom the plaintiff sold a security [6 B. WrrKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations §243 (8th ed. 1974)]. Section
25504.1, as added by Chapter 144, imposes civil liability on any person,
regardless of the existence of privity, if the following conditions can be
established: (1) the person materially assisted in a violation of one of the
several enumerated sections concerning the qualification and gale of securi-
ties in California [See generally CAL. CORP. CODE §§25110, 25120,
25401]; (2) there was, in fact, a violation of one of these sections; and (3)
the person acted with intent to deceive or defraud. If these three elements are
present, a defendant is jointly and severally liable with any person who is
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liable under those sections of the Corporations Code that generally create
civil liability for failure to comply with security qualifications and sales
requirements in this state [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.1. See generally CAL.
CORP. CODE §§25500-25510]. Thus, Chapter 144 appears to bring the
California security regulations one step closer to conformity to Rule lob-5
of the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission [Compare CAL. CORP.
CODE §25504.1 with Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F.2d 750, 759-61 (5th Cir.
1974), Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972) and
17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977) and Ruder, Disclosure of Financial Projec-
tions-Developments, Problems, and Techniques, in PRACrICING LAW IN-
SmUTE No. 5, FIFTH ANNuAL INSTITUTE ON SECURMES REGULATIONS 24
n.36, 30-33 (1974)].
Section 25504.2 provides that "[a]ny accountant, engineer, appraiser, or
other person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by such
person" may be liable for any material misrepresentation that is contained in
any prospectus, offering circular, or any written report or valuation that is
distributed with or referred to in such a prospectus or offering circular [CAL.
CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)]. Before liability is found to exist under Section
25504.2, however, this section requires that the following elements be
established: (1) the professional must have given written consent to be
named "as having prepared or certified in such capacity either any part of a
prospectus or offering circular or any written report or valuation referred to
in any such document" [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)]; (2) the profession-
al must have been named in such document as having prepared or certified
in such professional capacity the document in question [CAL. CORP. CODE
§25504.2(a)]; (3) the prospectus, circular or other related document must
have included an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of a
material fact that is necessary to keep the document from being misleading
[CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)(1)]; and (4) the plaintiff must have relied on
the untrue statement or on the omission in acquiring the security [CAL.
CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)(2)]. In addition to describing the elements of this
cause of action, Section 25504.2(b) provides the following defenses for the
affected professionals: (1) defendants may show that after reasonable inves-
tigation they had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that the
statements in a particular prospectus were true and that there were no
misleading omissions [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(b)(1)]; (2) defendants
may establish that such a document was not a fair representation or not a fair
copy of their statement [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(b)(2)]; or (3) defend-
ants may show that prior to a plaintiff's acquiring the security they notified
the issuer and the Corporations Commissioner in writing that they would
not be responsible for the document in question [CAL. CORP. CODE
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§25504.2(b)(3)]. Further, Section 25504.2 provides that persons who par-
ticipate in the preparation of a prospectus, offering circular, or related
document will be held liable only for those portions of the documents that
are expressly stated as having been made on their authority and that were
attributed to them with their written consent [CAL. CORP. CODE
§25504.2(c)]. Thus, Section 25504.2 appears to increase the potential
liability of certain professionals who certify or assist in the preparation of
various documents that are relied on by the public when buying corporate
securities.
Finally, the legislature has amended Sections 25506 and 25507 of the
Corporations Code apparently to indicate that the statute of limitations for a
violation of Section 25504.1 depends on the context in which a particular
violation occurs [See CAL. CORP. CODE §§25506, 25507]. All violations of
Section 25504.1 that involve omissions or untrue statements of material
facts in an offer to sell or purchase securities have a statute of limitations
that will expire four years after the violation or one year after the plaintiff
discovers the facts constituting a violation, whichever occurs first [See CAL.
CORP. CODE §25506]. Alternatively, civil actions for those violations of
Section 25504.1 that involve certain regulations governing the qualification
or transfer of corporate securities must be brought within two years of the
violation or within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting a
violation of these regulations, whichever expires first [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §25507. See generally CAL. CORP CODE §§25120, 25130, 25133,
25141, 25503, 25510]. A buyer, however, may not commence an action
under Section 25504.1 for the violation of a securities qualification or sales
regulation if, prior to commencement of the suit, the seller offers to repur-
chase, rescind, or pay damages for the defective securities with the approval of
the Corporations Commissioner as to the form of such an offer [See CAL.
CORP. CODE §25507(b)]. In contrast, all violations of Section 25504.2 must
be asserted in a civil action brought within one year after the discovery of
the facts constituting the violation, or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence [CAL. CORP. CODE §25506.1,
as added, CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 762, §6.7, at -]. Section 25506.1 further
provides that in no event shall an action be brought for a violation of Section
25504.2 more than three years after the act or transaction constituting the
violation [CAL. CORP. CODE §25506.1, as added, CAL. STATS. 1977, c.
762, §6.7, at -].
COMMENT
Chapter 144 is basically an extension of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Rule 10b-5 [Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.1 with 17
C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977)] and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
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[Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2 with 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970)] to
California corporate securities law. Rule 1Ob-5 proscribes, inter alia, any
material misrepresentation in the sale or purchase of securities that are
registered pursuant to federal law [See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977)].
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides a similar but more
restricted cause of action than the federal rule for any person acquiring a
security when the issuer's registration statement contained an untrue state-
ment or omission of a material fact [Compare 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970) with
17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1977)]. In comparing case interpretations of Rule
1Ob-5, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, and the language of
Sections 25504.1 and 25504.2, however, some interesting differences are
manifested that may create some confusion in the application of these new
sections. This comment will attempt to outline the comparisons that can be
drawn from an examination of the language of Chapter 144, Rule lOb-5, and
Section 11 to provide an indication of the manner in which the California
courts may interpret Sections 25504.1 and 25504.2 of the Corporations
Code.
Section 25504.1 applies to "[a]ny person who materially assists in any
violation" of certain provisions governing the qualification of securities or
the regulation of their sale [See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§25110, 25120,
25130, 25401]. It seems that this provision is primarily aimed at attorneys,
accountants, and other expert third parties who indirectly participate in the
sale or purchase of securities [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE
ON CORPORATIONS, LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE FOR CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
AIDING IN THE VIOLATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW, INTERIM REPORT
at 2 (Dec. 20, 1976) (hereinafter cited as CORPORATION COMMITTEE
REPORT)]. In order to be liable under Section 25504.1, such defendants must
materially assist in the violation at issue [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.1],
which is analogous to the "aider and abettor" liability that exists under Rule
lOb-5 [See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620-46 (1972)]. Thus, the require-
ment for material assistance would seem to be satisfied if the defendant
could be classified as an "aider and abettor" as that term is applied in the
federal courts [See id. at 625 n. 124 (listing federal cases on aider and
abettor theory)]. There appear to be four factors considered by the federal
courts in deciding whether particular assistance is material to a particular
violation: (1) the extent of the assistance provided by the defendant; (2) the
presence of the defendant at the time the fraud was perpetrated; (3) the
defendant's intent; and (4) the defendant's relation to the principal violator
[Comment, Rule 1Ob-5 Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 999, 1011 n.86 (1976)]. Thus, it
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would seem that the California courts may logically base their interpretation
of "material assistance," as required by Section 25504.1, upon the federal
courts' interpretation of "aider and abettor" liability under Rule lOb-5.
The most crucial interpretation problem in Section 25504.1, however,
apparently involves the element of "intent to deceive or defraud." One
possible interpretation would be for the courts to apply the definition of
deceit and defraud contained in Corporate Securities Law of 1968:
" '[f]raud,' 'deceit,' and 'defraud' are not limited to common law fraud or
deceit" [CAL. CORP. CODE §25006]. This provision of Section 25006
indicates that definitions of fraud and deceit, other than those that existed at
common law, are applicable to the Corporate Securities Law of 1968. As the
courts have interpreted these definitions, negligent misrepresentation has
been held to be a form of fraud and deceit [See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43
Cal. 2d 481, 487-88, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954); Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 38
Cal. 2d 91, 100, 237 P.2d 656, 662 (1952); Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 926, 930, 245 P.2d 532, 534-35 (1952); CAL. CIV. CODE §§1572,
1709, 1710]. While the courts may be hesitant to apply negligent misrepre-
sentation to Section 25504.1 due to the lack of a privity requirement [Cf.
Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104,
110- 11, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 1005-06 (1976) (factors for holding attorney
liable to a party not in privity for negligent misrepresentation)], case law
seems to indicate that reckless conduct might be construed as a form of
"intent to deceive or defraud" under Section 25504.1 [Cf. Wishnick v.
Frye, I 11 Cal. App. 2d 926, 930, 245 P.2d 532, 534-35 (1952) (representa-
tions by corporate directors concerning securities; scienter would be satis-
fied by statements made carelessly or recklessly)]. If California courts apply
these tort definitions to the civil remedy provisions of the Corporate Securi-
ties Law of 1968, then Section 25504.1 liability apparently would attach to
conduct that could be classified as intentional, in reckless disregard of the
truth, or, under limited circumstances, negligent misrepresentation. To the
extent that Section 25504.1 was intended primarily to regulate those actions
performed "with intent to deceive or defraud" (emphasis added), it is
arguable that the application of these other tort definitions may be inconsis-
tent with such a purpose [See CORPORATIONS COMMrIEE REPORT at 3-4].
Another possible interpretation of "intent to deceive or defraud" may be
derived by analogizing this language to the requirements of Rule lOb-5 of
the federal securities regulations. In the recent case of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder [425 U.S. 185 (1976)], the United States Supreme Court held
that a private cause of action for damages would not lie under Rule 1Ob-5 in
the absence of any allegations of "scienter," which was defined in footnote
12 as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"
and the Court further stated that "[w]e need not address here the question
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whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under Section 10b and Rule lOb-5" [id. at 193-94 n.12]. This
would seem to indicate that there may be some form of reckless conduct that
is sufficient to constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5 [See Pardon Products v.
Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 72 F.R.D. 556, 559 (1976); Lanza v.
Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2nd Cir. 1973); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact Upon the Scheme of
the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 628 (1976)]. Moreov-
er, it has been speculated that because of Hochfelder, Rule lOb-5 liability
could turn on the defendant's knowledge of the wrong and whether he or she
had materially assisted in its commission, since an intent to deceive, de-
fraud, or manipulate could be inferred from this type of knowledge and
action [Comment, Rule 10b-5 Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 999, 1002 (1976)]. The Court in
Hochfelder, however, apparently relied on the use of the word "manipu-
late" in Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to conclude that
some form of "intentional wrongdoing" was required to impose lOb-5
liability [See 425 U.S. at 197-99]. Consistent with this interpretation but in
somewhat more precise language, Section 25504.1 expressly creates civil
liability for any person who, with an intent to deceive or defraud, materially
assists in the sale or purchase of securities by means of any communication
that contains an untrue statement of a material fact or the omission of a
material fact that makes the communication misleading [CAL. CORP. CODE
§§25401, 25504.1]. If Hochfelder is premised on the use of the word
"manipulate" as a word of art used by Congress to proscribe intentional
conduct [See 425 U.S. at 197-99; Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 97
S.Ct. 1292, 1300-01 (1977)], then the use of the phrase "with intent to
deceive or defraud" in Section 25504.1 would seem to indicate an even
stronger intent on the part of the legislature at least to proscribe and to create
liability for intentional misconduct in securities transactions [See CORPORA-
TIONS COMMITTEE REPORT at 4]. In addition, this latter construction appears
to be the one originally intended by the proponents of this legislation and the
most consistent with a literal interpretation of the language of Section
25504.1 [See CORPORATION COMMITTEE REPORT at 1, 4-5]. Thus, it would
seem that the California courts will most likely interpret the phrase "with
intent to deceive or defraud" as requiring a defendant to act intentionally to
deceive a particular plaintiff or a general class of individuals to which the
plaintiff belongs.
As previously discussed, the language of Section 25504.2 seems to be
taken from the Securities Act of 1933, specifically Section 1 l(a)(4) and
Section 11 (b)(3), which provide that certain professionals will be liable for
untrue statements of material facts or omissions of material facts in the
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security registration statements, absent a showing by these professionals that
they acted with due diligence [15 U.S.C. §77k(a)(4), (b)(3) (1970)]. Appar-
ently, the purpose of Section 11 is "not so much to compensate the
defrauded purchaser as to promote enforcement of the Act and to deter
negligence by providing a penalty for those who fail in their duties"
[Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2nd Cir.
1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (emphasis added)]. It appears that
the underlying rationale behind this statement of the purpose of Section 11 is
the assumption that purchasers are not directly defrauded by registration
statements in the usual security transaction [See generally Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2nd Cir. 1969)]. Thus, it would
seem that by borrowing Section 11 language and applying it to misrepresen-
tations in prospectuses, offering circulars, and related documents, which
are directly relied on by purchasers, as opposed to merely registration
statements, the California Legislature appears to have created a section
designed primarily to compensate defrauded purchasers [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §25504.2].
Section 25504.2 applies to "[a]ny accountant, engineer, appraiser, or
other person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by such
person" [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)]. This seems to indicate that
attorneys will be liable under this section for statements made in a profes-
sional capacity [Cf. Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal
and State Securities Laws: Private Counselor or Public Servant, 61 CALIF.
L. REv. 1189, 1192-94 (1972) (attorneys are "other persons whose profes-
sion gives authority to a statement made by him" under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933)]. Initially, then, accountants, engineers, appraisers,
and lawyers are now jointly and severally liable with other parties making
untrue statements or misleading omissions if they cannot show that after a
reasonable investigation they had reasonable grounds to believe that state-
ments they made were true and contained no material omissions [CAL.
CORP. CODE §25504.2(b)(1)]. In essence this provision makes accountants
and other specified professionals liable for negligent misrepresentation in
the preparation or certification of a prospectus, offering circular, or related
document to plaintiffs not in privity with them [See CAL. CORP. CODE
§25504.2]. Noting again that Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 only
creates liability for negligent misrepresentation in preparation of the regis-
tration statement, it would appear that the legislature has provided liability
on the state level that does not exist on the federal level under either Section
11 or Rule 10b-5 [Compare Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) and 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970) and 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1977) with
CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2]. Section 25504.2 is self-limiting in its applica-
tion, however, since negligent misrepresentation alone is not enough with-
out written consent to have the statements attributed to the professional
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[CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)] and proof that the plaintiff relied on the
untrue statement or the misleading omission [CAL. CORP. CODE
§25504.2(a)(2)].
Section 25504.2 also provides that these professionals may avoid liability
for misrepresentations if they can prove that "after reasonable investigation
[they] had reasonable ground[s] to believe . . . that the statements . . .
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact" necessary
to prevent the document from being misleading [CAL. CORP. CODE
§25504.2(b)(1)]. This defense is the same as the one provided in Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933 [Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(b)(1)
with 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3) (1970)] and similar to the defense established by
Section 25501 of the Corporations Code, which requires the defendant to
show that he or she exercised reasonable care and did not know (or if he or
she had exercised reasonable care, would not have known) of the untruth or
omission [Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(b)(1) with CAL. CORP.
CODE §25501]. The California courts have not interpreted the defense in
Section 25501, but it seems reasonable to assume that this defense will be
construed consistently with its counterpart, Section 11 of the 1933 Securities
Exchange Act, which contains a statutory definition of reasonableness that
applies directly to Section 11 (b)(3): "[t]he standard of reasonableness shall
be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property"
[15 U.S.C. §77k(c) (1970)]. One federal court has further elaborated upon
this defense by stating that "[w]hat constitutes 'reasonable investigation'
and a 'reasonable ground to believe' will vary with the degree of involve-
ment of the individual, his expertise, and his access to the pertinent informa-
tion and data" [Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)]. Application of these reasonableness
tests leads to the conclusion that a professional will apparently be held to the
standards of his or her profession and that these standards may vary with the
particular defendant's involvement and access to information [See Ruder,
Disclosure of Financial Projections-Developments, Problems and Tech-
niques, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE SERIES No. 5, FIFrH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 37 (1974)]. Accordingly, professionals
governed by Section 25504.2 would appear to have a sound defense to
liability under this section, but the degree of difficulty to be experienced by
these professionals in establishing this defense under Section 25504.2 will
apparently depend on their position in a particular organization.
The misrepresentation violations under Sections 25504.1 and 25504.2
must be of a material fact that makes the specified document or report
misleading [CAL. CORP. CODE §25504.2(a)(1); See CAL. CORP. CODE
§§25401, 25504.1]. This requirement is the same as for a violation of
Section 25401 and the resultant liability under Section 25501 [CAL. CORP.
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CODE §§.25401, 25501]. The United States Supreme Court has recently
redefined materiality in the securities context, holding that "an omitted fact
is material if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable stockholder
would consider it important" [TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added)]. By the use of the word "would"
the Supreme Court seemed to be approving the test articulated in List v.
Fashion Park [340 F.2d 457 (2nd Cir. 1965)], which provided that "the
basic test of materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach impor-
tance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question" [Id. at 462]. Since both the federal and state
securities laws refer to a "material" fact or omission, it seems reasonable to
assume that the California courts would define materiality for the purpose of
Chapter 144 in the same manner.
In conclusion, it would appear that by adding Sections 25504.1 and
25504.2 to the Corporations Code, the legislature has extended liability for
securities fraud to certain professionals who, while not in privity with the
defrauded purchasers, or transferees, have made material misrepresentations
on which such defrauded individuals have relied to their detriment, and has
apparently provided a remedy in securities fraud cases similar to that which
exists under the federal law.
See Generally:
1) 3 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1971 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 269, 271 (measure of
damages under Corporations Code Section 25503) (1972).
2) A. BRONIBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD (1975).
3) H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS §§14-14.12
(compares California law to federal law on securities) (1973).
4) Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597
(1972).
5) Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: Private
Counselor or Public Servant, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1189 (1972).
Business Associations and Professions; antitrust law--district at-
torneys--parens patriae actions
Business and Professions Code §§16759, 16760 (new); §§16750,
16750.1, 16753, 16754, 16754.5, 16755 (amended).
AB 1158 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 540
Support: California Attorney General; Golden State Mobile Home Own-
ers Association
Opposition: California Manufacturers Association
AB 1159 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 541
Support: California Attorney General; Golden State Mobile Home Own-
ers Association
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Opposition: California Manufactuers Association
AB 1161 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 542
Support: California Attorney General, California Peace Officers Associa-
tion, Golden State Mobile Home Owners Association
Opposition: California Manufacturers Association
AB 1162 (Chel); STATS 1977, Ch 543
Support: California Attorney General, Golden State Mobile Home Own-
ers Association
Opposition: California Manufacturers Association
Chapters 540, 541, 542, and 543 amend and add various sections to the
Business and Professions Code to provide the Attorney General and the 58
county district attorneys with new enforcement mechanisms that are de-
signed to facilitate the prosecution of antitrust and price-fixing cases in Califor-
nia [See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16750, 16759, 16760; L.A.
Daily J., Apr. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 5]. The Business and Professions Code
authorizes the Attorney General to bring a cause of action on behalf of the
state or any of its public subdivisions or public agencies for restraint of
trade, and any individual "injured in his or her business or property" by
such unlawful conduct could sue and recover treble damages [See CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16750(a), (c)]. Prior to the enactment of these new
laws, county district attorneys apparently were precluded from prosecuting
any antitrust or price-fixing violations on their own initiative on behalf of
the county or any of its political subdivisions or public agencies, and thus, in
the absence of an Attorney General order to the contrary, required all such
actions to be initiated by the state Attorney General [See CAL. STATS. 1961,
c. 757, § 1, at 2013]. Even when ordered to initiate an action for a restraint
of trade violation, the power of county district attorneys to conduct thorough
investigations was severely limited in that the law did not authorize these
officials to issue subpoenas in connection with antitrust cases. Also, since
the average consumer's damages from antitrust or price-fixing violations are
usually slight and the bonding and notice requirements for filing class
actions are often prohibitive, these prior laws left consumers with few
remedies for the damages incurred by such unlawful business practices [See,
e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-79 (1973); L.A.
Daily J., Apr. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 5]. Finally, prior to the enactment of
Chapter 541, only actions brought pursuant to Section 16750 of the Business
and Professions Code were restricted by a four year statute of limitations,
while the time limit on prosecuting other antitrust violations was apparently
unclear [See CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 792, §1, at 1828].
In 1976 the Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976 [Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976)], which
allows, inter alia, state attorneys general to recover monetary damages on
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behalf of state residents by bringing a civil action as parens patriae for
violations of the federal antitrust laws [Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §301, 90 Stat. 1394-95
(1976); see H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2572-73 (hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT)]. An action in parens patriae permits an official to sue in
the name of the government on behalf of injured individuals [See HOUSE
REPORT at 8-9]. This federal legislation was enacted to provide an accessible
remedy to consumers because "it is the consuming public that ultimately
benefits from the enforcement of the antitrust laws" [HOUSE REPORT at 4]
and because there was no practical remedy for consumers that were
damaged by violations of the antitrust laws when the damage was to many
consumers in nominal amounts [HOUSE REPORT at 6-8; see Tunney, A View
From the Senate, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 510, 512 (1976); Note, ParensPatriae:
An Effective Consumer Remedy in Antitrust, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 135
(1976)]. The provisions of Section 16760 of the Business and Professions
Code, as added by Chapter 543, closely parallel those of the federal law and
would appear to provide California consumers with a more effective remedy
for injuries resulting from violations of state law governing restraints on
trade [See L.A. Daily J., Apr. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 5].
Section 16760 specifically provides that the Attorney General, or a
district attorney if the activities giving rise to the action or the effects of
such activities occur primarily within the district attorney's county, may
now bring a civil action as parens patriae for monetary relief for any injury
to the property of natural persons residing in California that is caused by a
violation of the provisions of the Business and Professions Code (commenc-
ing with Section 16700) relating to restraints on trade [CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§16760(a)(1), (g)]. The injury must be to the property of a "natural
person" for the provisions of Section 16760 to apply and this element is also
necessary under the parens patriae provision of the federal law [Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §301, 90
Stat. 1394 (1976)]. Under the federal law, the term "natural person. . . is
intended to exclude business entities such as corporations, partnerships, and
sole proprietorships" [HOUSE REPORT at 9] and it seems reasonable to
assume that the state law will be similarly interpreted. Chapter 543 further
provides that the Attorney General or a district attorney must give notice, as
directed by the court, of any action brought on behalf of the people of the
state or county for violation of the law relating to restraints on trade [CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(b)(1), (g)]. This notice may be by publication
or by such other means as required by the court to avoid denial of due
process to any person or persons [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(b)(1),
(g)]. Tnis notice provision is also apparently adopted from the federal law
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that requires notice by publication and the use of the best possible notice
practicable under the circumstances [Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976)].
Since Section 16760(b)(1) of the Business and Professions Code provides
that notice must meet due process requirements, if publication is not the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, the courts may be constitutional-
ly compelled to direct a further notice that does meet such requirements [See
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950); HOUSE REPORT at 12]. This notice requirement apparently will serve
the purpose of informing any person that may have a claim, as an individual
against the defendant, that the Attorney General is initiating a civil action as
parens patriae [Cf. HOUSE REPORT at 12 (purpose of federal law notice
provision is to inform individuals with claims of the parenspatriae action)].
Section 16760 allows an individual to elect to exclude his or her portion of
the claim from the parens patriae adjudication by filing notice to that effect
with the court [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(b)(2)]. Any final judg-
ment in a parens patriae action will operate as res judicata as to any
individual claim that has not been excluded in accordance with this section
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760(b)(3)]. Under the federal law the notice,
election, and res judicata provisions are designed to serve the constitutional
due process interests of both potential claimants and defendants [See HOUSE
REPORT at 11]. Thus, it would appear that the same interests are served by
the similar provisions in the California law.
Under the federal parens patriae provisions the defendant is subject to
treble damages once liability has been established [Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §301, 90 Stat. 1394
(1976)]. Chapter 543 authorizes the court to award only "the total damage
sustained" and the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees,
and thereby apparently is designed to provide a remedy to injured consumers
rather than to impose a penalty to deter unlawful restraints of trade [See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(a)(2)]. Specifically, the court must
exclude from such damages any amount that duplicates an award already
given for the same injury [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(a)(1) (A)], any
amount that is allocable to an individual who has excluded his or her claim
from the parens patriae action [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§16760(a)(1)(B)(i)], and any amount allocable to a business entity [CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(a)(1)(B)(ii)]. Further, when there has been a
determination that a defendant agreed to fix prices, the damages may be
measured in an aggregate amount "by statistical or sampling methods, by
the pro rata allocation of illegal overcharges or of excess profits," or by any
means the court determines is reasonable to estimate aggregate damages
without requiring proof as to individual claims and damages [CAL. Bus. &
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PROF. CODE §16760(d)]. The parallel federal provision for measurement of
damages is designed to ease the burden of proving damages and consequent-
13, guarantees a remedy when liability is established [See Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §301, 90 Stat.
1394 (1976); HOUSE REPORT at 14]. By adopting this flexible rule on proof
of damages, the California Legislature apparently has provided injured con-
sumers, who are being represented by the Attorney General or a district
attorney as parens patriae in price-fixing cases, with a more certain remedy
than might be expected in a private lawsuit [Cf. HOUSE REPORT at 14-15
(federal law is designed to provide consumers with a more certain remedy)].
In addition, Chapter 543 provides specific guidelines for the distribution of
the damage award: (1) the court is to insure to the extent possible that each
individual represented is afforded a reasonable opportunity to receive his or
her proportionate share [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(e)(1)]; (2) the
Attorney General or district attorney is to retain the costs of the suit and a
reasonable attorney's fee for deposit in either the Attorney General Antitrust
Account or in an appropriate account provided by law [CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§16760(e)(2), (g)]; and (3) if the damage award is not exhaust-
ed, the remaining funds are to be considered unclaimed property and dealt
with under specified provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure [CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 16760(e)(3). See generally CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE §§ 1540-
1542]. In addition, should a defendant prevail, the court may award rea-
sonable attorney's fees to such defendant upon a finding that the Attorney
General or district attorney has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16760(a)(3)].
Chapter 543 specifically provides that a restraint of trade action brought
as parens patriae "shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court" and notice of any such dismissal or compromise must
be given to the court [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16760(c)]. This provision
is apparently designed to guarantee that all parens patriae actions are
pursued diligently and any compromises or settlements are fair and just to
the consumers represented [Cf. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §301, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976); HOUSE
REPORT at 13 (federal law's similar provision designed to promote public
confidence in parens patriae settlements)].
All county district attorneys are authorized by Chapter 543 to bring any
action as parens patriae that the Attorney General may bring pursuant to
Section 16760(a), and are further authorized by Chapter 540 to bring any
action on behalf of their county or its political subdivisions that the Attorney
General is authorized to bring for damages under Section 16750 for viola-
tions of the law relating to restraints on trade or any comparable federal law
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16750(g), 16760(g)]. Such actions, however,
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may be brought by a district attorney only when the activities giving rise to
such prosecution occur primarily within his or her county [CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§16750(g), 16760(g)]. Furthermore, the district attorney
must, before bringing an action as parens patriae or an action on behalf of
his or her county, file with the Attorney General a copy of the proposed
complaint together with a confidential memorandum and report setting forth
the facts and reasons that give rise to the proposed complaint at least 30 days
prior to the filing of such complaint [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16750(g),
16760(g)]. In an action brought by a district attorney on behalf of the state or
any of its agencies, the Attorney General is authorized to take full charge of
the action if the Attorney General deems it necessary and in the public
interest [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16750(g)]. Further, a district attorney
must also give notice to the Attorney General at least 30 days before any
settlement or stipulated judgment of such actions and this notice must
include a copy of the proposed settlement and an explanation of the action
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16750(g), 16760(g)].
Chapters 541 and 542 further strengthen California's antitrust laws by
clarifying the applicable statute of limitations in such actions and providing
district attorneys with enlarged investigatory powers [See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§16750.1, 16759]. Section 16750.1 has been amended by
Chapter 541 to clearly state that any civil action brought to enforce any
cause of action under the antitrust laws of California must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. Chapter 542 adds
Section 16759 to the Business and Professions Code and provides that a
district attorney who reasonably believes that there may have been a viola-
tion of the statutory prohibitions against restraints on competition, conspir-
acy against trade, or unfair trade practice or competition is now authorized
to exercise all those investigatory powers granted to the Attorney General as
the head of a department. Thus, a district attorney may now subpoena
witnesses, records, papers, books, and other documents as well as exercise
all the other powers that the Attorney General may exercise under Article 2
(commencing with Section 11180) of the Government Code when inves-
tigating an antitrust violation [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16759; CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§11180-11191]. Thus, it appears that by authorizing both the
state Attorney General and local district attorneys to initiate civil actions for
the benefit of injured consumers for violations of these state laws and by
granting county district attorneys the same investigatory and prosecutorial
powers as the state Attorney General when taking action against local
antitrust violations, Chapters 540, 541, 542, and 543 are designed to
strengthen the civil enforcement of California antitrust law.
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amendments
Business and Professions Code § 17912 (amended); Code of Civil Proce-
dure §416.20 (amended); Commercial Code §§8103, 8204 (amended);
Corporations Code §§503.1, 1101.1, 2110.1, 2302.1 (new); §§ 114, 153,
171, 204, 207, 212, 305, 307, 311, 316, 317, 416, 418, 420, 500, 601,
604, 701,705,708,902, 904, 910,1001,1101,1103,1108,1109,1110,
1201, 1305, 1501, 1702, 1802, 2000, 2115, 2203, 2302, 2307, 25142
(amended); Government Code §26205.1 (amended); Insurance Code
§838.5 (amended); Public Utilities Code §822 (amended); Revenue and
Taxation Code §§23221, 23302, 23305a, 23776 (amended).
AB 256 (Knox); STATS 1977, Ch 235
Support: State Bar of California; California Department of Corporations
Chapter 235 makes several technical amendments in the General Corpora-
tion Law [CAL. CORP. CODE §§100-8999] that became effective January 1,
1977 [See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§114, 171, 204]. While most of the
provisions of Chapter 235 are apparently designed to clarify the law and to
provide uniformity to certain aspects of the General Corporation Law, this
review of Chapter 235 will focus on the substantive changes of this enact-
ment.
Articles of Incorporation
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 235, Section 204(a)(5) of the Corpora-
tions Code provided that the articles of incorporation could contain a
provision increasing the proportion of the vote of the directors necessary for
corporate action beyond that otherwise prescribed by the Code [CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 641, §6.2, at -]. Section 204(a)(5), as amended by Chapter 235,
now provides that such a provision of the articles of incorporation may also
prescribe a larger proportion of directors necessary for a quorum for taking
action than is otherwise required by the Code [CAL. CORP. CODE
§204(a)(5)].
Section 904 of the Corporations Code now provides that if an amendment
to the articles of incorporation would make shares assessable or would
subject fully paid shares to an action for collection of an assessment then it
need only be approved by the outstanding shares affected [CAL. CORP.
CODE §904] instead of by all the outstanding shares [CAL. STATS. 1975, c.
682, §7, at 1573].
Shareholder Voting
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 235, the Corporations Code indicated
that the clause "[a]pproved by (or approval of) the shareholders" required
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an affirmative vote of a majority of the shares represented at a shareholder
meeting [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 641, §2.4, at -]. This definition apparently
required a majority of all the shares represented at a meeting, including
those abstaining, and thus, a greater number of affirmative votes would be
necessary to constitute a majority [See CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 641, §2.4, at
-]. Section 153 of the Corporations Code now defines approval of the
shareholders as an affirmative vote of the majority of shares represented and
voting at the meeting. Thus, it would appear that an approval of the
shareholders would no longer take abstentions into account when determin-
ing whether an affirmative vote constituted a majority [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §153].
A further definitional amendment made by Chapter 235 is in the area of
shareholder replacement of directors. Under the prior law, Section 305 of
the Corporations Code was ambiguous as to the vote required to fill a
vacancy in a board of directors created by the removal of a director [See
CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 641, §7.5, at -]. Chapter 235 appears to resolve this
ambiguity by clearly indicating that shareholders may fill a vacancy created
by removal of a director only by approval of a majority of the shares
represented and voting [Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §305(a), (b) with
CAL. CORP. CODE §153.].
Further, with regard to shareholder voting, Section 604 of the Corpora-
tions Code provides that all proxies distributed to ten or more shareholders
of a corporation with 100 or more shareholders must contain the specific
matters to be acted upon and provide space for shareholders to approve,
disapprove, or abstain [CAL. CORP. CODE §604]. Prior to the enactment of
Chapter 235, however, Section 604 expressly denied the application of these
requirements to general proxies, which were proxies in which the proposals
or candidates on which shareholders were to vote were not set forth, and
stated further that such requirements should not preclude the use of general
proxies [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1392, §1, at -]. Chapter 235 deletes this
exception to the rules governing the form of proxies, and thus, would appear
to preclude the use of general proxies as defined [See CAL. CORP. CODE
§604]. Further, with regard to irrevocable proxies, Chapter 235 provides
that such proxies may now be revoked by any transferee, instead of any
purchaser, who takes shares without knowledge of the proxy provisions
unless the irrevocability clause appeared on the share certificates [CAL.
CORP. CODE §705(f)]. Thus, Chapter 235 would seem to be extending
protection against unknown irrevocable proxies beyond a purchaser of
shares subject to such a proxy to any person who is a transferee without
notice of the irrevocability [See CAL. CORP. CODE §705(f)].
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Board of Directors
Section 311 of the Corporations Code provides that the board of directors
of a corporation may designate committees of two or more members to serve
the board by a resolution adopted by a majority of the authorized number of
directors. This section further provides that the board may designate alterna-
tive members for said committees [CAL. CORP. CODE §311]. Chapter 235
amends Section 311 to require that the appointment of members or alternate
members must also be by the vote of a majority of the authorized number of
directors [CAL. CORP. CODE §311].
Corporate Transactions
Chapter 235 amends Section 500 of the Corporations Code to eliminate
the prohibition against using "appreciation in value not yet realized" in
determining corporate assets for shareholder distribution purposes [See
CAL. CORP. CODE §500(b)(2); CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 641, §14, at -]. It
would appear that by allowing California corporations to use "appreciation
in value not yet realized" as an asset for the purpose of shareholder
distributions, Chapter 235 will place this state among the minority of states
that allow such a procedure [Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §500 with Randall
v. ]3ailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942) and Finn, Price-Level
Accounting for Corporate Dividends, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 59, 70
(1972)]. While taking into account that unrealized appreciation may give a
corporation more flexibility in determining assets available to meet the
statutory requirement for distribution of earnings [See CAL. CORP. CODE
§500], this flexibility may be limited if the California courts follow the other
minority jurisdictions allowing the inclusion of unrealized appreciation and
require "that this fund should be based upon 'actual values' . . . and not
the mere book value" of the assets [See Finn, Price-Level Accounting for
Corporate Dividends, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 59, 70 (1972)].
Chapter 235 adds Section 503.1 to provide that the restrictions of the
General Corporation Law on corporate distributions will not apply "to a
purchase or redemption of shares of a deceased shareholder from the
proceeds of insurance on the life of such shareholder" [CAL. CORP. CODE
§503.1. See generally CAL. CORP. CODE §§500, 501, 502, 503]. The
proceeds used to make such a purchase or redemption, however, must be
"in excess of the total amount of all premiums paid by the corporation for
such insurance" [CAL. CORP. CODE §503.1 (emphasis added)]. Thus, it
appears that a corporation is now expressly authorized to utilize certain
insuranoe policy proceeds to repurchase or redeem shares issued to the
person who is the subject of the policy.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 235 a sale of assets that constitutes
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reorganization as defined in Section 181 of the Corporations Code was not
subject to the approval provisions of Section 1001, but had to be approved
by each corporation participating in the reorganization [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §1200] and by a majority of the outstanding shares [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §§152, 1201(d)]. Chapter 235 provides that a sale of assets that
constitutes a reorganization must now be approved by at least 90percent of
the voting power if the buyer is in control of or under the common control
with the seller [CAL. CORP. CODE §1001(d)]. This requirement does not
apply, however, if the sale is in consideration of the nonredeemable com-
mon shares of the purchasing corporation or its parent [CAL. CORP. CODE
§1001(d)]. Section 1001 has been amended to further provide that even if
buyers, who are selling all or substantially all of their assets, are in control,
or under common control with the seller, the terms of the sale need not be
approved by the shareholders if they have been previously approved by the
Commissioner of Corporations, the Insurance Commissioner, or the Public
Utilities Commission [CAL. CORP. CODE §1001(e). See generally, CAL.
CORP. CODE §25142; CAL. INS. CODE §838.5; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§822].
Section 1101 of the Corporations Code provides that the board of each
corporation desiring a merger must approve a merger agreement that sets
forth the details and procedures of the merger [CAL. CORP. CODE §1101].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 235 it appears that the law was unclear as
to what corporations or other persons were required to be parties to such an
agreement [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 641, §19, at -]. Chapter 235 amends
Section 1101 to provide that constituent corporations must be parties to the
agreement and that a parent party corporation and other persons may be
parties to such an agreement [CAL. CORP. CODE §1101]. The last two
sentences of Section 1101 of the Corporations Code additionally provide
that a merger agreement must treat each share of the same class or series of
any constituent corporation equally with respect to any distribution of cash,
property, rights, or securities [CAL. CORP. CODE §1101] and that the
nonredeemable common shares of a constituent corporation may be convert-
ed only into nonredeemable common shares of the surviving corporation or
a parent party when the constituent corporation or its parent owns shares of
another constituent corporation representing more than 50 percent of its
voting power prior to the merger [CAL. CORP. CODE §1101]. Both require-
ments are subject to exceptions provided by the provisions of Section 407 of
the Corporations Code dealing with fractional shares and provided by
consent of the shareholders of the class [CAL. CORP. CODE §1101]. In
addition, Chapter 235 adds Sections 1101.1 to provide that the above
requirements of Section 1101 "do not apply to any transaction if the
Commissioner of Corporations, the Commissioner of Insurance or the Pub-
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lic Utilities Commission has approved the terms and conditions of the
transaction and fairness of such terms and conditions" [CAL. CORP. CODE
§1101.1]. Since it would appear that the purpose of Section 1101 require-
ments is to protect the interest of the shareholders in a merger transaction
[See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 ], Section 1101.1 would seem to continue this
purpose by subjecting the terms and conditions of a merger to the approval
of the Insurance and Corporation Commissioners or the Public Utilities
Commission before the exception to Section 1101 comes into operation.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 235 a corporation that did not own all of
the outstanding shares of a subsidiary corporation that was party to a merger
was required to give at least ten days notice to each shareholder of such
subsidiary corporation prior to the effective date of the merger [CAL. STATS.
1976, c. 641, §20, at -]. Section 1110, as amended by Chapter 235, now
provides that such notice must be given at least 20 days prior to the effective
date of the merger [CAL. CORP. CODE §1101(i)].
General Provisions
Section 1501 of the Corporations Code sets forth specific circumstances
and time periods by which a corporation must send its shareholders an
annual financial report [CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501]. Prior to the enactment of
Chapter 235 all such financial statements were required to be prepared in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles [CAL. CORP.
CODE § 114]. Chapter 235 provides that such financial statements for corpo-
rations with fewer than 100 holders of record of its shares no longer need be
prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles if the
report reasonably sets forth assets and liabilities, income and expenses, and
discloses the accounting basis used [CAL. CORP. CODE §1501(a)].
In addition, Chapter 235 makes two amendments in the California Uni-
form Commercial Code concerning the validity of liens upon securities and
restrictions on the transfer of securities [See CAL. COM. CODE §§8103,
8204]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 235 a lien upon a security was valid
against a purchaser only if noted conspicuously on the security [CAL.
STATS. 1963, c. 819, §8103, at 1955]. Chapter 235 extends this provision to
all transferees of the security, unless the transferee took with actual knowl-
edge of the lien [CAL. COM. CODE §8103]. In addition, though arguably the
law prior to the enactment of Chapter 235 [See CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 819,
§8103, at 1955], Section 8103 now makes it clear that a transferee who
receives securities with actual knowledge of a lien would be subject to this,
regardless of whether the lien was conspicuously noted on the security
certificate [CAL. COM. CODE §8103]. Similarly, under the prior law, restric-
tions on transfer of securities imposed by the issuer were effective only if
noted conspicuously on the security or were against a person with actual
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knowledge of the restrictions [CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 819, §8204, at 19571.
Section 8204, as amended by Chapter 235, now provides that such restric-
tions are effective if noted conspicuously or are against a transferee,
including a purchaser from the issuer, who has actual knowledge of the
restrictions [CAL. COM. CODE §8204].
Finally, Chapter 235 provides that the General Corporation Law will not
become applicable to banks, as that term is defined in Section 102 of the
Financial Code, until January 1, 1979 [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 235, §30.5, at
-1, which extends for one year the period during which banks will continue
to be governed by the applicable provisions of the Financial Code [See CAL.
FIN. CODE §§100-3706]. In conclusion, it would appear that by enactment
of Chapter 235 the legislature is providing uniformity and clarity to certain
aspects of the General Corporation Law as well as providing several sub-
stantive changes in the law that governs corporations in California.
See Generally:
1) 7 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 258 (Review of General
Corporations Law) (1976).
2) California's New General Corporation Law, 7 PAC. L.J. 583 (1976).
Business Associations and Professions; liquidated damages
Civil Code §§1670, 1676 (repealed); §1669, Chapter 2 (commencing
with §1675) (new); §§1671, 1951.5, 3358 (amended); Education Code
§92050 (new); §90226 (amended); Government Code §§14376, 53069.85
(amended); Streets and Highways Code §5254.5 (amended).
AB 570 (McAlister); STATS 1977, Ch 198
(Effective July 1, 1978)
Support: California Association of Realtors; California Law Revision
Commission
Generally authorizes the use of liquidated damages provisions in
specific types of contracts; provides specific guidelines for measur-
ing the reasonableness of liquidated damages provisions in real
property contracts for the sale of residential and nonresidential
property, certain public contracts, and for contracts not covered
by another statute; continues the prior law restrictions on liq-
uidated damages provisions in specified consumer contracts.
Chapter 198 generally authorizes the use of liquidated damages in con-
tracts entered into after July 1, 1978 [CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 198, §16, at-].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 198, parties to a contract could, under
some circumstances, agree on the amount or manner of computation of
damages recoverable for breach of contract. Sections 1670 and 1671 of the
Civil Code permitted the enforcement of a liquidated damages provision
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only when the actual damages "would be impracticable or extremely dif-
ficult to fix" [CAL. CIV. CODE §§1670, 1671 as enacted 1872]. In addition,
the courts had developed a second requirement that a liquidated damages
provision must reflect a "reasonable endeavor" to estimate actual damages
[E.g., McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 584, 297 P.2d 981, 986 (1956);
Better Food Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 187,
253 P.2d 10, 15 (1953)]. It has been argued that judicial decisions interpret-
ing and applying these requirements provide an inadequate guide to con-
tracting parties and has severely limited the use of liquidated damages
provisions [Recommendation Relating to Liquidated Damages, 13 CAL.
LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1739
(1976) (hereinafter cited as RECOMMENDATIONS)]. Chapter 198 repeals Sec-
tion 1670 of the Civil Code, which made void all liquidated damages
provisions .that were not governed by other statutes or did not meet the
criteria of impracticability as set forth in the former version of Section 1671
of the Civil Code [See CAL. Crv. CODE §1670 as enacted 1872].
Chapter 198 provides different standards for the validity of liquidated
damages provisions in the following types of contracts: (1) specified con-
sumer purchases and rentals [CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(c), (d)]; (2) the sale or
purchase of residential property [CAL. Civ. CODE §1675]; (3) all contracts
not expressly governed by another statute, including the sale or purchase of
nonresidential property [CAL. CIV. CODE §§1671(b), 1676]; and (4) all
contracts expressly governed by another statute, including certain public
construction contracts [CAL. Cr. CODE §1671(a); see, e.g., CAL. COM.
CODE §2718; CAL. EDUC. CODE §§90226, 92050; RECOMMENDATIONS at
1750].
The prior law restrictions on the validity of liquidated damages are
retained in cases against a consumer for a purchase or rental of personal
property or services primarily for domestic use [CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(c)
(1), (d)] and in cases against a lessee of real property used as a dwelling by
the lessee or his or her dependents [CAL. Civ. CODE §1671(c)(2), (d)].
Thus, for these two types of consumer contracts, a liquidated damages
provision will be upheld only if it would have been "impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix the actual damage" [CAL. CIV. CODE §1671(d)]
and the provision constitutes a "reasonable endeavor" to estimate the actual
damages [McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 584, 297 P.2d 981, 986
(1956); RECOMMENDATIONS at 1752].
A different standard for upholding the validity of a liquidated damages
provision is established by Chapter 198 in cases in which the buyer defaults
on a contract for the purchase of residential real property [CAL. Crv. CODE
§§1675, 1678]. Residential property is defined as a dwelling containing not
more than four residential units, at least one of which the buyer intends, at
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the time of making the purchase contract, to occupy as his or her residence
[CAL. CIV. CODE §1675(a)(1)-(2)]. Section 1675(b) provides that if the
parties to a contract agree that all or any part of a payment made by the
buyer will constitute liquidated damages in the case of the buyer's default, it
is valid as liquidated damages to the extent that the buyer has actually made
such payment in the form of cash or check, including post-dated check
[CAL. CIv. CODE §1675(b)]. Thus, if the liquidated damages provision
asserts damages for more than was actually paid in "earnest money"
deposited by the buyer, the provision is now valid only to the extent of the
amount actually paid by the buyer [RECOMMENDATIONS at 1754]. Similarly,
if the amount paid is greater than the amount specified in the liquidated
damages provision, only the specified amount may be recovered as liq-
uidated damages [Id. ]. In addition, Section 1675 now establishes three
percent of the purchase price as a threshold standard by which to measure
the reasonableness of liquidated damages provisions in contracts for the sale
or purchase of residential property [CAL. CIV. CODE §1675(c), (d)]. If the
amount paid as liquidated damages pursuant to Section 1675(b) does not
exceed three percent of the purchase price, the buyer has the burden of
establishing that the liquidated damages provision was unreasonable [CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1675(c)]. On the other hand, if the amount paid exceeds three
percent, then the party seeking to enforce the provision has the burden of
establishing that the additional amount was reasonable [CAL. CIV. CODE
§1675(d)]. In determining whether the amount paid was reasonable, the
court must consider both the circumstances at the time the contract was
made [CAL. Crv. CODE §1675(e)(1)] and the price, terms, and circum-
stances of any subsequent sale or contract to sell the property made within
six months of the buyer's default [CAL. CIV. CODE §1675(e)(2)]. The
provision for considering any subsequent sale would appear to have been in
response to the Governor's veto of similar legislation in 1976 [See JOURNAL
OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 21614-15 (1976 Reg. Sess.); AB 3169, 1976
Regular Session].
Chapter 198 also provides that a liquidated damages provision for a
buyer's default in a contract to purchase and sell real property is now valid
only if it is separately signed or initialed by the parties to the contract [CAL.
Crv. CODE §1677(a)]. In addition, if a liquidated damages provision is
contained on a printed contract, it must be printed in either a ten-point bold
type or contrasting red print in at least eight-point bold type [CAL. Civ.
CODE §1677(b)]. Further, Section 1678 of the Civil Code requires a sepa-
rately signed or initialed agreement whenever any subsequent payment is
intended to constitute liquidated damages for the buyer's failure to purchase
real property [CAL. CIV. CODE §1678]. Importantly, Sections 1675 through
1681 extend only to provisions concerning liquidated damages for a buyer's
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failure to purchase property, and the liquidated damages provisions for a
seller's default are to be governed by Section 1671 [CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1679]. These sections, however, do not affect the right of a party to a
contract to obtain specific performance of the contract [CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1680]. Moreover, none of the provisions of Section 1675 through 1681
apply to "contracts for the purchase of real property" as defined in Section
2985 of the Civil Code, which are contracts in which the parties agree to
convey real property upon satisfaction of specified conditions that do not
require conveyance of title within one year of the date of the contract [CAL.
CIV. CODE §§1681, 2985]. Finally, if a liquidated damages provision is
upheld under the provisions of Sections 1675 or 1676, the limitations of
Section 3307 of the Civil Code relating to damages for breach of an
agreement to purchase real property will not apply [RECOMMENDATIONS at
1755-56].
Chapter 198 establishes a third standard to test the validity of liquidated
damages provisions in contracts for the purchase or sale of nonresidential
real property and for all contracts not expressly governed by another statute
[CAL. CIV. CODE §§1671(b), 1676]. Section 1671(b) provides that liq-
uidated damages provisions contained in either of these types of contracts
are valid unless the party seeking to avoid such a provision sustains the
burden of proof that the provision was "unreasonable under the circum-
stances existing at the time the contract was made" [CAL. CIV. CODE
§1671(b)]. In determining whether the amount of liquidated damages is
unreasonable, the court may consider all the circumstances existing at the
time of contracting, including: (1) the relationship between foreseeable
harm and the amount of liquidated damages; (2) the relative equality of the
bargaining power of the parties; (3) whether the parties were represented by
counsel at the time of contracting; (4) the anticipation of the parties that
proof of actual damages would be costly or inconvenient; (5) the difficulty
in proving causation and foreseeability; and (6) whether the liquidated
damages provision is included in a form contract [RECOMMENDATIONS at
1751-52]. Thus, the court apparently may not judge the reasonableness of a
liquidated damages provision in retrospect or consider the amount of actual
damages suffered as having any bearing upon the validity of such a damage
provision [See CAL. CIV. CODE §1671(b); RECOMMENDATIONS at 1751].
Similarly, in determining the validity of liquidated damages against a buyer
who defaults in a contract for the purchase or sale of nonresidential proper-
ty, Section 1676 provides that the same standard of "unreasonableness
under the circumstances at the time the contract was made" must be shown
to invalidate any liquidated damages provision in such a contract. Further-
more, liquidated damages provisions in contracts for the sale or purchase of
nonresidential property are subject to the same requirements of separate
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signing or initialing and minimum type-size printing as those governing
such provisions in contracts involving residential property [See CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 1676-1678]. In addition, Section 1676, like the sections relating to
contracts for the sale or purchase of residential property, is limited to
situations involving defaulting buyers and is inapplicable to Section 2985
contracts and makes inapplicable the damages provisions of Section 3307
[See CAL. CIV. CODE §§1679, 1681; RECOMMENDATIONS at 1755, 1756].
The provisions of Section 1671, which generally allow for liquidated
damages, do not extend to contracts governed expressly by another statute
[CAL. CIV. CODE §1671(a)]. Chapter 198, however, amends certain code
sections to specifically allow for liquidated damages in some public con-
tracts. Section 90226 of the Education Code is amended to provide that
construction delay payments in state university and college contracts are
now expressly valid as liquidated damages unless such damages were
manifestly unreasonable at the time the contract was made [CAL. EDUC.
CODE §90226]. Further, Chapter 198 adds Section 92050 to the Education
Code to provide that the Regents of the University of California may include
a liquidated damages provision in construction contracts for the University
of California that allows a specified sum of money to be deducted from
payments due, or to become due, to a contractor for each day of delay after
the completion date specified in the contract. Such a sum is valid as
liquidated damages unless it was manifestly unreasonable at the time the
contract was made [CAL. EDUC. CODE §92050]. This section also permits
the Regents to include a bonus for contractors who complete projects prior
to the specified date in their contract [CAL. EDUC. CODE §92050]. Section
92050 does not prevent the Regents from including other provisions con-
cerning liquidated damages in any contract for contruction, but does specify
that the validity of such provisions is to be governed by Civil Code Section
1671 [RECOMMENDATIONS at 1761].
Chapter 198 also amends Government Code Sections 14376 and
53069.85 concerning forfeiture provisions for delays in completion of con-
struction contracts entered into by the state pursuant to the State Contract
Act [CAL. GOV'T CODE §§14250-14424] and local public works contracts
entered into by local agencies [CAL. Gov'T CODE §53069.85]. These
amendments provide that any sum that must be forfeited pursuant to Sec-
tions 14376 and 53069.85 is valid as liquidated damages "unless manifestly
unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was
made" [CAL. GOV'T CODE §§14376, 53069.85]. Section 5254.5 of the
Streets and Highways Code is similarly amended with regard to contracts
entered into pursuant to the Improvement Act of 1911 [CAL. STS. & HY.
CODE §§5000-6794].
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COMMENT
Chapter 198 appears to expand the potential use of liquidated damages
provisions in California. The California Law Revision Commission has
indicated several useful functions that may be served by such provisions,
including the avoidance of the cost, difficulty, and delay of proving dam-
ages in litigation; the avoidance of possible inequities of the normal rules of
damages; and the potential conservation of judicial resources due to the fact
that liquidated damage provisions may lead to fewer contract breaches and
fewer lawsuits [RECOMMENDATIONS at 1740-41]. There exists, however, a
great potential for the abuse of liquidated damage clauses in cases of
unequal bargaining strength of the parties [See RECOMMENDATIONS at 1741]
and consequently, Chapter 198 retains the prior restrictions on enforceabili-
ty of liquidated damages provisions in cases of consumer purchases for
domestic needs and residential leases [CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (c), (d)].
Chapter 198 is nearly identical to Assembly Bill 3169 that was introduced
in the 1975-76 regular session of the legislature. Assembly Bill 3169 was
vetoed by the Governor because, as he stated, "[i]n cases where the value of
the real property is expected to increase and the seller will suffer no actual
damages, automatic retention by the seller of any amount deposited by the
buyer is unreasonable" [JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 21614-15
(1976 Reg. Sess.)]. It would appear, therefore, that Section 1675(e) (2) was
added to meet the Governor's objection. This section requires consideration
of "the price, terms, and other circumstances" of a subsequent sale or
contract to sell that is made within six months of the buyer's default on the
contract [CAL. CIV. CODE §1675(e) (2)]. It appears that the court is to
consider whether or not the seller suffers actual damages by looking to the
price, terms, and other circumstances of a subsequent transaction. Follow-
ing the rationale of the veto message and Section 1675(e)(2), it ap-
pears that a court would find a liquidated damages clause in the sale of
residential property invalid if the seller is able to sell the property within six
months of a default and suffers no actual damage [See CAL. CiV. CODE
§1675(e)(2)]. This particular test of reasonableness appears inconsistent
with the "unreasonable at the time of contracting" test that is applied to all
contracts covered by section 1671(b) and to all contracts for the sale of res-
idential property [CAL. Crv. CODE §§1671(b), 1675(e)(1), 1676] and may
operate to partially frustrate the purpose for liquidated damages; that pur-
pose being to provide both the buyer and the seller with some assurance that
a reasonable deposit will operate as a guarantee of the buyer's performance
or serve as "damages" to the seller if the buyer defaults [See Sweet,
Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 84, 100 (1972)]. If
Section 1675(e)(2) requires consideration of actual damages in the determi-
nation of reasonableness, it would appear that, at least in regard to buyer
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defaults in contracts for the purchase or sale of residential property, Chapter
198 may not "relieve the already overburdened courts of the frustrating and
difficult process of determining the amount of damages for contract breach"
[Id..at 1451.
The overall impact of Chapter 198 would appear to be an increased use of
liquidated damages provisions in California contract law, which should
result in both more certain remedies and more clearly defined liabilities for
parties to a contract that is breached, as well as a saving of judicial
resources.
See Generally:
I) Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84 (1972).
Business Associations and Professions; business discrimination in
interstate or foreign commerce
Business and Professions Code § 16721.6 (new).
SB 927 (Carpenter); STATS 1977, Ch 859
(Effective September 17, 1977)
Support: Bank of America
In 1977 California became one of a few states to enact legislation that was
apparently aimed at prohibiting individuals and businesses from complying
with the boycott provisions imposed against Israel by the Arab League [See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16721, 16721.5; H.R. REP. No. 95-190, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1138, 1161 (hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT); Sacramento Bee, Apr. 28,
1976, §A, at 6, col. 5; Senator David Roberti, Press Release, No. 87, Aug.
11, 1976]. On June 22, 1977, the Export Administration Amendments of
1977 came into effect on the federal level [Export Administration Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)] and provide for
regulations to prohibit any United States person with certain exceptions,
from complying with the provisions of a foreign boycott [Export Adminis-
tration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)]. In
an apparent response to this federal legislation, Chapter 859 has been
enacted to provide that to the extent that Sections 16721 and 16721.5 are to
be applied to transactions in interstate or foreign commerce they are to be
interpreted and applied so as not to conflict with federal law [CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §16721.6].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 859, Section 16721 of the Business and
Professions Code expressly prohibited the exclusion of any person from a
business transaction on the basis of an express discrimination policy im-
posed by a third party [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16721(a)]. Further,
Section 16721.5 specifically made it an unlawful trust and an unlawful
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restraint of trade for any person: (1) to grant or accept any letter of credit or
enter into any contract for goods or services when such document contains a
provision requiring any person to discriminate or to certify that such person
has not dealt with any other person on a discriminatory basis [CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §16721.5(a)]; or (2) to refuse to grant or accept any letter of
credit or enter into any contract for goods or services because it does not
contain a discrimination provision [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16721.5(b)].
Chapter 859 adds Section 16721.6 to the Business and Professions Code to
provide that it is the intent of the legislature that the above sections "be
interpreted and applied so as not to conflict with federal law with respect to
transactions in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States"
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16721.6]. Thus, it would now appear that to the
extent that Sections 16721 and 16721.5 are to be applied to restrictive trade
practices or boycotts in interstate or foreign commerce, that application is to
be consistent with the federal law [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16721.6].
The federal law governing restrictive trade practices and foreign boycotts
referred to in Section 16721.6 would appear to be the 1977 amendments to
the Export Administration Act [Compare CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 859, §2, at
- with Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52,
§§201-205, 91 Stat. 244-48 (1977)]. The Export Administration Act in
general "would prohibit U.S. persons, including U.S. controlled sub-
sidiaries and affiliates abroad, from discriminating against or refusing to do
business with other persons in response to a foreign boycott request, require-
ment, or agreement" [HOUSE REPORT at 5]. The Export Administration Act
also contains, however, "[s]everal significant exceptions" to the above
prohibition "to permit normal commercial practices to be followed, to avoid
disruptions of business resulting from any intractable conflict of this...
law with specific laws of foreign countries, and to interfere as little as
possible with the right of any soverign nation to conduct a direct, primary
boycott of another nation" [HousE REPORT at 5; see Export Administration
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, §201, 91 Stat. 245 (1977)].
Thus, Sections 16721 and 16721.5 of the Business and Professions Code
would now apparently be interpreted to provide the same exceptions as the
federal law when applied to interstate or foreign commerce transactions.
Since Chapter 859 only provides for federal law conformity in terms of
interstate and foreign commerce transactions [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16721.6], it is arguable that Sections 16721 and 16721.5 may still have an
independent application and interpretation when applied to intrastate trans-
actions. Thus, it is possible that Sections 16721 and 16721.5 will still
prohibit the situation in which A enters into a contract with B, which
requires that B refuse to deal with C because C is dealing with D without
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any exceptions when the entire transaction concerns California persons and
commerce exclusively [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16721, 16721.5].
Chapter 859 also provides that Sections 16721 and 16721.5 shall be
applied in the previously discussed manner only "to the extent, if any, not
preempted by the Export Administration Act of 1969 as amended" [CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16721.6]. The Export Administration Amendments of
1977 provide, however, that "[t]he amendments made by this title and the
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall preempt any law, rule, or
regulation of any of the several States . . . which pertains to participation
in, compliance with, implementation of, or the furnishing of information
regarding restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by
foreign countries against other countries" [Export Administration Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, §205, 91 Stat. 248 (1977)]. Such an
express preemption clause should effectively preclude the enforcement of
Sections 16721 and 16721.5 of the California Business and Professions
Code to the extent that they are sought to be applied to foreign boycotts,
since "[w]here Congress has unequivocally and expressly declared that the
authority conferred by it shall be exclusive, then there is no doubt but that
states cannot exert concomitant or supplementary regulatory authority over
the identical activity" [Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,
447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1971)]
[See Comment, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLuM. L. REV. 623, 625 (1975)]. It
is apparently the intent of Congress in this instance to preempt "all State
laws which have the same purpose and goal" as the federal legislation
[HOUSE REPORT at 24]. Thus, since the apparent purpose of Sections 16721
and 16721.5 is to make illegal business discrimination caused by the Arab
League's boycott of Israel in California [See Sacramento Bee, Apr. 28,
1976, §A, at 6, col. 5; Senator David Roberti, Press Release, No. 87, Aug.
11, 1976. Contra, OP. CAL. LEGIS. COUNSEL No. 9055 (May 6, 1976)] and
Chapter 859 now expressly provides for an interpretation of these sections
that is not in conflict with the federal law [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16721.6], it would appear that the Export Administration Amendments of
1977 may be interpreted so as to completely preempt Sections 16721 and
16721.5 of the Business and Professions Code. It is also possible, however,
to conclude that to the extent Sections 16721 and 16721.5 are applied to
nonforeign boycott types of business discrimination in exclusive intrastate
transactions, the federal law may not preempt such application [See CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §16721.6; HOUSE REPORT at 24].
In summary, by stipulating the possibility of preemption, Chapter 859
may provide the courts with an expression of legislative intent as to the
continuing vitality of Section 16721 and 16721.5 of the Business and
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Professions Code in light of the federal government's express intent to
maintain exclusive control of the issues concerning foreign boycotts and
their effect on business practices in the United States.
See Generally:
1) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 201 (Sections 16721 and
16721.5 of the Business and Professions Code) (1977).
Business Associations and Professions; warranty service and re-
pair contracts
Business and Professions Code §17048.5 (new)
§17026 (amended).
SB 625 (Roberti); STATS 1977, Ch 787
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act [CAL. CIV. CODE §§1790-
1795.7] requires every manufacturer of consumer goods to designate au-
thorized service and repair facilities reasonably close to retail outlets in
order to carry out the terms of express warranties [CAL. CIV. CODE
§1793.2(a)(1)]. Apparently as a result of this requirement "[a] handful of
large manufacturers dictate the terms of warranty service contracts with
thousands of independent repair shops, and the repairman is often forced to
perform warranty service below his actual costs" [Senator David Roberti,
Press Release, No. 49, May 12, 1976]. As a result of these subcost
contracts, repair shops are apparently forced to cut corners, oftentimes
causing them to "turn out shoddy work" [Id.]. Chapter 787 amends the
Unfair Trade Practices Act [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§17000-17101] to
provide that this type of warranty service and repair contract is now unlaw-
ful as an unfair trade practice [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17048.5].
Chapter 787 specifically provides that "[ilt is unlawful for any manufac-
turer, wholesaler, distributor, jobber, contractor, broker, retailer, or other
vendor, or any agent of any such person," to contract for the performance of
warranty service or repair of such person's products with any service or
repair agency if the service or repair will be provided "below the cost to
such service or repair agency of performing the warranty service or repair"
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17048.5]. Cost is defined by Chapter 787 so as
to include "the cost of parts, transporting the parts, and all overhead
expenses of the service agency" [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17026]. Any
independent service or repair agency will be able to enjoin violations of
Chapter 787 [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17070] as well as seek treble
damages and attorney's fees for any injury resulting from such violation
[See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17082].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 787 it would appear that independent
service and repair agencies were entitled to "actual and reasonable cost of
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repair, including any cost for parts and any reasonable cost of transporting
the goods or parts, plus a reasonable profit" in any contract entered into
with a manufacturer for the performance of warranty service or repair [CAL.
CIv. CODE §§1793.2(a)(1), 1793.3(c); Senator David Roberti, Press Re-
lease, 73, June 23, 1976]. For a violation of this provision of the Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, an independent service or repair agency
can apparently recover treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees [See
CAL. Civ. CODE §1794.3]. Section 1793.2(a)(1) of the Civil Code, howev-
er, provides that although the rates under such a warranty service contract
must be in conformance with Section 1793.3(c), this does not preclude the
use of a discount in such contracts that is "reasonably related to reduce
credit and general overhead cost factors arising from the manufacturer's
payment of warranty charges direct to the independent" [CAL. CIv. CODE
§1793.2(a)(1)]. Section 17026 of the Business and Professions Code, on the
other hand, defines cost for the purpose of warranty service agreements so
as to include "labor and all overhead expenses" [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§17026] and thus, Section 17048.5 does not seem to permit a discount to
reduce such costs to the manufacturer that enters into such a contract with an
independent service or repair agency [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17048.5].
Thus, a contract rate that may have been permitted under the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act due to its provision for a discount may be in
violation of Section 17048.5 as an unfair trade practice if such discount
brings the rate below the cost to the independent service or repair agency
making the repair. In conclusion, it would appear that by prohibiting these
below cost contracts, Chapter 787 attempts to assure California consumers
high-quality service and provide warranty service and repair shops with an
adequate remedy to redress any violation of this prohibition.
See Generally:
I) 8 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 267 (1976 amendments to
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act) (19M7.
Business Associations and Professions; privacy of business
records
Civil Code §§1799, 1799.1, 1799.2 (new).
AB 679 (Chimbole); STATS 1977, Ch 221
Support: California Franchisee Council, California Service Station
Council
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 221 there was apparently no specific
prohibition of the disclosure of records prepared or maintained by business
entities performing bookkeeping services for individuals or other business
entities. Although it would appear that an argument may be made that such
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disclosure by a bookkeeping service could violate Article I, Section 1 of the
California Constitution as an infringement upon privacy [Cf. White v.
Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105-
06 (1975) ("The right of privacy. . . prevents. . . business interests from
• . .misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other
purposes. . ."); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d
825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1976) ("Privacy is protected not merely
against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which may not be
violated by anyone")], no such interpretation of the amendment has been
applied specifically to the "bookkeeping services" context. By enactment
of Chapter 221, however, the legislature has now specifically proscribed
disclosure of records by business entities performing bookkeeping services
[CAL. CIV. CODE §1799.1].
Chapter 221 provides that any business entity, as defined in Section 1799
of the Civil Code, which performs bookkeeping services and discloses in
whole or in part the contents of any of its records to any person other than
the individual or business entity that is the subject of the record, will be
liable to such person for actual damages sustained, but in no case less than
$500, plus the attendant court costs and reasonable attorney's fees [CAL.
CIv. CODE §§1799.1, .2]. The cause of action established by Chapter 221
must be brought within two years from the date on which it arose [CAL. CIV.
CODE §1799.2].
Section 1799.1 excepts certain disclosures from its provisions, and thus, a
disclosure does not give rise to a cause of action for damages if such
disclosure: (1) is made pursuant to a subpoena or court order; (2) is
discoverable; (3) is made to a person acting pursuant to a lawful search
warrant; (4) is made to a law enforcement agency for the purpose of
"investigations of criminal activity," unless the disclosure is prohibited by
law; or (5) is made to a taxing agency for the purpose of tax administration
[CAL. Civ. CODE §1799.1].
The effective operation of Chapter 221 appears to be somewhat limited by
the definitions of "bookkeeping services" and "business entity" as set
forth in Section 1799 of the Civil Code. This section defines "bookkeeping
services" as "keeping books, making trial balances, preparing statements
. . . as part of bookkeeping operations" but excludes those services in
which the trial balances, statements or reports are issued "as having been
prepared by or examined by a certified public accountant or public account-
ant" [CAL. CIV. CODE §1799(a); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§5051,
5052. See generally 16 CAL. ADM. CODE §54 (breach of confidential
relationship if certified public accountant or public accountant discloses
information obtained from a client)]. In addition, the definition of "business
entity" specifically excludes any "financial institution organized, chartered
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or holding a license or authorization certificate under a law of this state or
the United States . . [or] the parent of any such financial institution, [or]
any subsidiary of any such financial institution or parent" [CAL. CIV. CODE
§1799(b)]. Thus, the civil remedy created by Chapter 221 for disclosure of
business records would appear to be applicable to only those businesses that
are not regulated as financial institutions and that perform limited bookkeep-
ing services for other businesses that do not include preparation or review by
certified public accountants or public accountants. In this manner, Chapter
221 is apparently intended to protect small businesses and franchises that
contract for bookkeeping services with certain business entities from having
the financial records of their operations involuntarily disclosed to others.
Business Associations and Professions; savings and loan associa-
tions-conformity to General Corporation Law.
Financial Code §§5500.1, 9201.1 (new); 5503, 5512.5, 5653, 6456.5,
7616, 8400, 9200, 9201, 9206, 9207, 9209, 9214, 9215, 9216 (amended).
AB 637 (Robinson); STATS 1977, Ch 626
Support: California Savings and Loan League; California Department
of Savings and Loan
Chapter 626 amends the existing Savings and Loan Association Law to
bring its provisions into line with the General Corporation Law, which
became effective on January 1, 1977 [See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§5503,
5653, 9200, 9201, 9207]. Section 5500.1 of the Financial Code specifies,
however, that in applying the statutory provisions regulating transition to
this new General Corporation Law [See CAL. CORP. CODE §§2300-2319],
"effective date" as used in Section 2300 of the Corporation Code now
means January 1, 1978, which is also the effective date of Chapter 626.
Chapter 626 also provides that savings and loan associations may now
merge with their subsidiaries when the parent association owns 90 percent or
more of the outstanding stock of the subsidiary [CAL. FIN. CODE §§9215,
9216(b)].
Section 5503 of the Financial Code now requires the articles of incorpora-
tion of a savings and loan association to include in the statement of purpose
that the association is formed primarily to engage in the business of a
savings and loan and any other lawful activities not prohibited to such
associations [CAL. FIN. CODE §5503(a)]. This amendment conforms the
statement of purpose in the articles of incorporation of a savings and loan
association to those of other corporations [See CAL. CORP. CODE §202(b)
(1)].
Prior law voided any amendment to the articles of incorporation that made
"any change in the rights, preferences, or privileges of any outstanding
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stock or shares . . . adverse to the holders' unless such change was
approved by the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock adversely
affected" [CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 619, §1, at 1497]. Further, a two-thirds
majority was required if a domestic association sought to transfer all or a
substantial part of its assets to a domestic or federal association, or to effect
a merger [CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1143, §2, at 2164-65]. Chapter 626 now
provides that any amendments to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of
an association that make any change in the rights, preferences or privileges
of any outstanding stock or share need only be approved by a majority of the
outstanding stock adversely affected [CAL. FIN. CODE §5653] and that
agreements to transfer a major portion of an association's assets or of merger
agreements similarly only require approval of a majority of the outstanding
shares [CAL. FIN. CODE §§9200, 9201, 9207]. These amendments further
conform the law governing savings and loan associations to that governing
other corporations under the General Corporation Law [See CAL. CORP.
CODE §§204(a)(5), 9033. Chapter 626 also provides that when a merger or
consolidation agreement has been approved, unless approved unanimously,
the parent association must mall a notice to the stockholders or shareholders
ten days before submitting the certificate required by Section 9210 to the
Savings and Loan Commissioner [CAL. FIN. CODE §9209].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 626, a savings and loan association
could not effect a merger with one of its subsidiaries unless it owned all of
the subsidiary's outstanding stock [CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1143, §2, at 2168-
69]. Sections 9215 and 9216 of the Financial Code now provide that such
mergers may be effective if the parent association owns at least 90 percent
of the subsidiary's outstanding stock [CAL. FIN. CODE §9216(b)]. The
procedures for a 90 percent merger, however, are more complicated than
those established under prior law for a merger in which the parent was
required to own all of the subsidiary's stock. The parent and the subsidiary
must each adopt resolutions agreeing to the merger and the parent associa-
tion's resolution must state that the parent assumes all the liabilities of the
subsidiary and must indicate the amount of consideration that the parent is
providing for the stock it does not already own [CAL. FIN. CODE §9216(b)].
The subsidiary's resolution must approve the fairness of the consideration
that the parent is offering for the outstanding stock [CAL. FIN. CODE
§9216(b)]. In addition, the parent association may now adopt the name of
any disappearing subsidiary despite any other provision of law [CAL. FIN.
CODE §9216(c)]. After adoption of the merger resolutions, Chapter 626
further requires the parent association to submit a certificate of ownership to
the Savings and Loan Commissioner, which must contain: (1) a statement
that the parent owns at least 90 percent of the subsidiary's stock; (2) a copy
of the parent association's resolution; (3) a copy of the subsidiary's resolu-
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tion; and (4) notice of the time and place at which these mergers were
adopted and the vote by which they were approved [CAL. FIN. CODE
§9216(d)]. If, however, the merger is one in which the parent association
does not own all of the outstanding stock, then the parent must notify each
stockholder of the subsidiary association by mail at least 20 days before the
effective date of the merger [CAL. FIN. CODE §9216(e)]. The notice must
contain: (1) the effective date of the merger; (2) a copy of the merger
resolutions; and (3) pursuant to Section 1301(a) of the Corporations Code:
(a) a copy of Sections 1300-1304 of the Corporations Code, (b) a statement
of the fair market value of the outstanding stock of the subsidiary, and (c)
the procedure by which a stockholder may enforce his or her rights [CAL.
FlN. CODE §9216(e)]. Finally, Chapter 626 provides that stockholders of a
subsidiary savings and loan association involved in a merger now have the
right to demand that the parent association pay cash for their shares pursuant
to Chapter 13 of the General Corporation Law [CAL. FIN. CODE §9216(e)].
Thus, Chapter 626 conforms the Savings and Loan Association Law to
the new General Corporation Law and provides that savings and loans may
now merge with their subsidiaries if the parent association owns at least 90
percent of the subsidiary's outstanding stock. These provisions would ap-
pear to provide greater uniformity to the regulation of corporate business in
California and to establish more realistic merger procedures for savings and
loan associations in this state.
See Generally:
1) Mueller v. MacBan, 62 Cal. App. 3d 258, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976) (requirements for a
shareholder derivative suit against a savings and loan association).
2) 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §§200-209(a).
3) 7 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECrED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 258 (Review of General
Corporation Law) (1976).
Business Associations and Professions; savings and loan associa-
tions-farm loans
Financial Code §7154.5 (new); Government Code §§16522, 16612,
53630, 53651, 53657 (amended).
AB 44 (Robinson); STATS 1977, Ch 60
(Effective May 18, 1977)
Support: California Savings and Loan League
Chapter 60 gives express statutory authority for state chartered savings
and loan associations to make loans secured by real property when the
principal improvement on the property consists of a combination of a farm
residence and property used for a commercial farming enterprise [CAL. FIN.
CODE §7154.5]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 60, the Financial Code
authorized savings and loan associations to make loans secured by various
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kinds of real property, but there was no express authority for long-term
loans secured by farm property [See CAL. FIN. CODE §§7153-7154].
In April of 1975, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the authority that
issues rules and regulations for the federally chartered savings and loan
associations, expressly authorized the federal associations to make long-
term farm loans within specified criteria [12 C.F.R. §541.12(c) (1977)].
Pursuant to Section 5500.5 of the Financial Code, the State Savings and
Loan Commissioner was able to authorize state chartered savings and loan
associations to make similar farm loans on the same terms as those au-
thorized by federal regulations [10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.13]. Thus, prior
to January 1, 1977, state regulations provided that these state associations
could make loans secured upon real property if the following criteria were
met: (1) the principal improvement on the property was either a farm
residence or a commercial farming enterprise or a combination thereof; (2)
the loan was payable in 25 years; (3) the loan was not in excess of 80 percent
of the appraised value of the property; (4) the commercial farming enterprise
did not include hobby and vacation property and was operational within a
reasonable time; and (5) the farm residence was used for residential pur-
poses for not more than four families [10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.13]. Thus,
until its expiration in January of 1977, Section 235.13 of the Administrative
Code provided California savings and loan associations with the same
general loan authority as the federal institutions.
Chapter 60, which has apparently been enacted in response to the expira-
tion of Administrative Code Section 235.13, requires that the principal
improvement on the property that is to be used as loan security consist of a
farm residence and a commercial farming enterprise [CAL. FIN. CODE
§7154.5]. This provision is more restrictive than existing federal law, which
requires that the principal improvement be only a commercial farming
enterprise [12 C.F.R. §545.6-1 (1977)]. Thus, a state chartered savings and
loan association may not be able to make loans in certain situations in which
the federally chartered institutions would be able to do so. Furthermore, for
a state chartered savings and loan association to make a loan secured by real
property under Chapter 60, the portion of the principal improvement that
consists of a farm residence must be the owner's principal residence [CAL.
FiN. CODE §7154.5(d)] and the commercial farming enterprise segment of
the principal improvement must be a farm that is operational within a
reasonable time and one that does not include hobby or vacation property
[CAL. FIN. CODE §7154.5(c)]. Finally, the law now requires that these loans
must be repayable within 25 years and may only be made in an amount that
does not exceed 80 percent of the appraised value [CAL. FIN. CODE
§§7154.5(a), (b)]. The lending requirement on state chartered savings and
loans that the principal improvement on property that is to be used as loan
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security be a combination farm residence and commercial farming enter-
prise may indicate an intent by the legislature to limit these loans to the so-
called "family farm" operations. This legislative intent is further evidenced
by the requirement that the residence be the principal residence of the owner
of the farm [CAL. FIN. CODE §7154.5(d)]. Thus, the language and apparent
intent of Chapter 60 would seem to allay fears that this legislation would
result in a diversion of home loan funds for strictly commercial farms.
Finally, Chapter 60 adds the bonds, debentures and other obligations of
two federal agencies, the Government National Mortgage Association and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, to the list of securities that
may be posted by a depository of state or local agency funds [CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§16522(e), 53651(f)]. A further amendment extends the availability
of these new securities to savings and loan associations [CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 16612(e)], which may now accept such instruments as security for demand
and time deposits of public funds [See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§16600-16609].
Thus, Chapter 60, in addition to some technical amendments concerning
public fund depositories, appears to reinstate the authority of state chartered
savings and loan associations to make long term residential farm loans and
thus ensure the near-parity of these associations with their federal counter-
parts.
Business Associations and Professions; savings and loan associa-
tions-loan authority
Financial Code §§6420, 7155.3, 7184.1 (new).
AB 913 (McAlister); STATS 1977, Ch 97
Support: California Savings and Loan League, Department of Savings
and Loan
Regulations adopted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board permit
federally chartered savings and loan associations to issue investment certifi-
cates or withdrawable shares that are evidenced by marketable certificates of
deposit [12 C.F.R. §545.1-5 (1977)]; to make loans, advances of credit, or
invest in interests therein on the security of residential real property when
not otherwise authorized by law for specified reasons [12 C.F.R. §545.6-26
(1977)]; and to make, purchase, or invest in loans for constructing or
improving residential real property based on the borrower's general credit
standing [12 C.F.R. §545.8(c) (1977)]. Pursuant to Section 5500.5 of the
California Financial Code, which authorizes the Savings and Loan Commis-
sioner to issue regulations giving state chartered savings and loan associa-
tions comparable authority to their federal counterparts, the Commissioner
promulgated regulations giving the state chartered savings and loan associa-
tions authority to accept savings deposits evidenced by marketable certifi-
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cates of deposit and to make these same residential real property loans that
the federal savings and loan associations are authorized to make under the
federal regulations [See 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §§218, 235.15, 235.16,
235.17]. Chapter 97 generally codifies these regulations so that state char-
tered savings and loan associations may continue to conduct business under
the same guidelines as their federal counterparts [See CAL. FIN. CODE
§§6420, 7155.3, 7184.1].
Section 6420 of the Financial Code authorizes a savings and loan associa-
tion to issue investment certificates or withdrawable shares, which are
evidenced by marketable certificates of deposit [CAL. FIN. CODE §6420].
Such certificates or shares must be for fixed terms and bear fixed returns
[CAL. FIN. CODE §6420]. Further, a savings and loan association may
authorize a commercial bank that is insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation "to prepare, sign and deliver such certificates and to
collect and transmit funds in connection therewith" [CAL. FIN. CODE
§6420]. Section 6420, however, makes clear that commercial banks au-
thorized to act in this capacity are not "collectors" or "salesmen." Prior to
the enactment of Chapter 97, state chartered savings and loan associations
were authorized by the Administrative Code to use marketable certificates of
deposit in the above manner until the regulation expired on January 1, 1978
[See 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.17]. Since both Section 235.17 of the
Administrative Code and Section 6420 of the Financial Code provide that
the authority therein is subject to the regulations of the commissioner, it
appears that Section 218 of the Administrative Code, which sets out certain
limitations on marketable certificates of deposit, will continue to apply to
such certificates [Compare 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §§218 and 235.17 with
CAL. FN. CODE §6420]. Section 218 was adopted "to implement, interpret
and carry out the provisions of Section 235.17" and provides regulations on
the return, terms, limitations, required provisions, form, transfer or with-
drawal, and filing for marketable certificates of deposit [10 CAL. ADM.
CODE §218]. Thus, it would appear that savings and loan associations' use
of marketable certificates of deposit under Chapter 97 should remain consis-
tent with the use of such certificates under the prior parity regulations.
Section 7155.3 of the Financial Code generally authorizes savings and
loan associations to "make loans or advances of credit or invest in interests
therein, on the security of residential real property" in cases in which such.
practices are not authorized under the prior law in five specific instances
[CAL. FIN. CODE §7155.3]. Thus, a savings and loan association may now
make loans or advances of credit, or invest in interests therein upon residen-
tial real property security even if: (1) the security interest is not a first lien;
(2) the loan-to-value ratio, stated maturity, or loan amount is in excess of the
maximum allowable limits; (3) there is a lack of any required borrower
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certification or required private mortgage insurance; (4) the loan would
cause an applicable percentage-of-assets category to be excluded; or (5) the
combination of any of the above factors [CAL. FIN. CODE §7155.3]. Prior to
the enactment of Chapter 97 such loan authority was given to state chartered
savings and loan associations by Section 235.15 of the Administration Code
which expired January 1, 1978 [See CAL. ADM. CODE §235.15]. Although
Section 7155.3 of the Financial Code closely parallels former Section
235.15 of the Administrative Code, this new section of the Financial Code
appears to be less restrictive in its application than the prior regulations
[Compare CAL. FIN. CODE §7155.3 with 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.15].
Specifically, state savings and loan associations apparently may now have
scheduled items in excess of two and one-half percent of risk assets and need
no longer have a statutory worth in excess of four percent of total assets in
order to make investments in specified loans, advances of credit or interest
therein secured by residential real property [Compare CAL. FIN. CODE
§7155.3 with 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.15]. This prior regulation also
provided that a savings and loan association that had a statutory net worth in
excess of four percent of total assets could obtain an exception to the
scheduled items not in excess of two and one-half percent of risk assets
requirement from the Savings and Loan Commissioner [10 CAL. ADM.
CODE §235.15]. Such exception is not contained in Section 7155.3 of the
Financial Code, and thus, it would appear that state savings and loan
associations may now make the authorized investments pursuant to Section
7155.3 without regard to the former scheduled items and net worth limita-
tions unless reimposed by the Savings and Loan Commissioner [See CAL.
FIN. CODE §7155.3]. As in the past, however, such investments under
Section 7155.3 are subject to the limitation that no association shall have at
any one time more than an amount equal to the lesser of: (1) two percent of
its total assets plus one-half percent of total assets for each percentage point
of statutory net worth in excess of four percent of assets; or (2) five percent
of its total assets [CAL. FIN. CODE §7155.3(a); see 10 CAL. ADM. CODE
§235.15]. Finally, Section 7155.3 continues to provide that a secured
investment is deemed unsecured to the extent that it exceeds the appraised
value or purchase price of the security and that certain authorized invest-
ments shall be considered as not having been made pursuant to this Section
[See CAL. FIN. CODE §7155.3(c)].
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 97 Section 235.16 of the California
Administrative Code provided that certain savings and loan associations
could make loans "directly for constructing, adding to, improving, altering,
repairing, equipping, or furnishing what is or is not expected to become
residential real property, where the association relies substantially for repay-
ment on the borrower's general credit standing and forecast of income, with
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or without other security, or the association relies on other assurances for
repayment" [10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.16]. Section 235.16 expired on
January 1, 1978, but has been substantially codified by Chapter 97 in
Section 7184.1 of the Financial Code [Compare CAL. FiN. CODE §7184.1
with 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.16]. Under the prior law an association
could not have scheduled items in excess of two and one-half percent of risk
assets and was required to have a statutory net worth in excess of four
percent of total assets in order to qualify for such loan authority [10 CAL.
ADM. CODE §235.16]. Section 7184.1 of the Financial Code does not
contain the above requirements but does subject loans to regulations of the
Savings and Loan Commissioner [See CAL. FIN. CODE §7184.1 ]. Thus, it
would appear that now any association may make such loans regardless of
scheduled items/risk assets ratio and statutory net worth unless the Commis-
sioner promulgates regulations similar to those contained in former Section
235.16 of Title 10 of the Administrative Code. In all other respects it would
appear that Section 7184.1 of the Financial Code is parallel in its require-
ments with former Section 235.16 of the Administrative Code, including
requiring that all such loans be fully documented to establish the reliability,
source, purpose, and overall soundness of the loan [Compare CAL. FIN.
CODE §7184.1(a)(1)-(8) with 10 CAL. ADM. CODE §235.16(b)(1)-(8)] and
that the investment in such loans by any association shall not at any one time
exceed an amount equal to the lessor of: (1) two percent of its total assets
plus one-half percent of total assets for each percentage point of statutory net
worth in excess of four percent of assets; or (2) five percent of its total assets
[Compare CAL. FIN. CODE §7184.1(b) with 10 CAL. ADM. CODE
§235.16(a)].
By enactment of Chapter 97 the legislature would appear to be providing
state chartered savings and loan associations with investment loan authority
substantially similar to that of federally chartered associations and thus
insuring that the state associations will remain substantially on par with their
federal counterparts in their ability to make certain loans and investments.
Business Associations and Professions: insurers-sale of securities
Insurance Code §827.5 (new).
SB 290 (Briggs); STATS 1977, Ch 1020
The issuance of any security that is authorized by the Insurance Commis-
sioner is generally exempt from the qualification requirements of the
California Corporate Securities Law [CAL. CORP, CODE §25100(e)]. Prior to
the enactment of Chapter 1020, however, the sale or transfer of any security
by an insurer required authorization from the Insurance Commissioner
[CAL. INS. CODE §827]. Chapter 1020 generally provides that certain insur-
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ers will now be exempt from obtaining this prior authorization from the
Commissioner for specified securities transactions [See CAL. INS. CODE
§827.5]. Chapter 1020 specifically applies to admitted insurers, nonadmitt-
ed foreign insurers, nonadmitted alien insurers, and an attorney in fact of a
reciprocal or interinsurance exchange [CAL. INS. CODE §§826, 827.5] and
expressly excludes any insurer organized under the laws of this state [See
CAL. INS. CODE §827.5. See generally CAL. INS. CODE §26]. Thus, it
appears that unlike domestic insurers, foreign insurers who conduct business
in this state will no longer be required to obtain the approval of the Insurance
Commissioner for specified security transactions [See CAL. INS. CODE
§827.5].
The security transactions that are exempted from the requirement of prior
approval of the Commissioner by Chapter 1020, parallel exemptions that
have existed for some time under the Corporate Secruities Act [CAL. CORP.
CODE §§25000-25804] [Compare CAL. INS. CODE §827.5 with CAL. CORP.
CODE §25103]. Specifically this exemption applies to the following transac-
tions: (1) negotiations or agreements that take place prior to a general
solicitation for shareholder approval of specified transactions [CAL. INS.
CODE §827.5(a)]; (2) "[a]ny change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
restrictions of or on outstanding securities of such insurer" unless the
holders of at least 25 percent of the substantially and adversely affected
outstanding shares have addresses in this state [CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(b).
See generally CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(d)]; (3) "[a]ny exchange incident to a
merger, a consolidation, an acquisition of outstanding stock, or a sale of
corporate assets in consideration of the issuance of securities of another
insurer or corporation" unless at least 25 percent of the holders of the
outstanding shares of any class have California addresses and are to receive
securities in the exchange of the surviving, consolidated, or purchasing
corporation or insurer [CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(c). See generally CAL. INS.
CODE §827.5(d)]; (4) changes in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
restrictions of or on outstanding shares, excepting transactions of a specified
nature that would materially and adversely affect any class of shareholders
[CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(e)]; (5) stock splits or reverse stock splits except
transactions that generally would substantially affect the shareholders [See
CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(f)]; and (6) changes in the rights of outstanding debt
securities except in certain specified transactions that substantially and
adversely affect any class of securities [CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(g)].
Thus, a nondomestic insurer may apparently now issue securities in this
state without obtaining approval of the Insurance Commissioner when such
issuance will not affect 25 percent or more of the issuer's California
shareholders or is in conformance with one of the above exemptions [See
CAL. INS. CODE §827.5(a)-(f)]. Since it appears that the exempted transac-
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tions in Section 827.5 of the Insurance Code are nearly identical to those in
Section 25103 of the Corporations Code [Compare CAL. INS. CODE §827.5
with CAL. CORP. CODE §25103], the purpose of Chapter 1020 would seem
to be to realize greater conformity and consistency in the operation of
California corporate securities law.
Business Associations and Professions; formulation of state bar
rules of professional conduct by initiative
Business and Professions Code §6076.5 (new).
AB 1001 (Brown); STATS 1977, Ch 478
Support: State Bar of California
The State Bar of California is governed by a board of governors that is
charged by Section 6030 of the Business and Professions Code with the
executive function of the state bar and the enforcement of the provisions of
the State Bar Act [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§6000-6190.6]. The board of
governors has authority pursuant to Sections 6076 and 6077 of the Business
and Professions Code to formulate rules of professional conduct that, when
approved by the California Supreme Court, become binding upon all mem-
bers of the state bar. Since the rules thus formulated become the rules of the
supreme court upon the court's approval [Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677,
680, 289 P. 818, 819 (1930)], and since the power of the court to make such
reasonable rules and regulations is not open to serious challenge, it seems
that the court could, on its own or any other person's initiative, propose and
approve new rules of professional conduct. It appears, however, that to date
all amendments to the rules of professional conduct have been the result of
proposed changes formulated by the board of governors.
Chapter 478 provides a means by which lawyers as a community may
submit proposed rules to the state supreme court for its approval. Section
6076.5 is added to the Business and Professions Code to permit active
members of the state bar to formulate rules of professional conduct by an
initiative procedure. These rules are to have the same force and effect, when
approved by the supreme court, as those that have been formulated by the
board of governors and approved by the supreme court [CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §60765(p)].
Section 6076 of the Business and Professions Code, which is the statutory
source of the board of governor's power to propose rules of professional
conduct, uses the language "may formulate" to accomplish its grant of
power. Under this authority, the board has periodically revised and aug-
mented the rules [See, e.g., RuLEs OF PROF. CoNDuCT OF STATE BAR 2-107
(added in 1975 to prohibit collection of illegal or unconscionable fees) and
1-100 (1975 amendment of prior rule proscribing wilful breach of a rule of
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conduct)] and in 1974 adopted the first complete revision of the rules since
they were originally adopted in 1928 [See Proposed New Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 49 CAL. S.B.J. 542 (1974)]. Section 6076.5 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code uses the same language-'"may formulate"-to
create the power to propose rules of professional conduct in the members of
the bar. Although the bill, as introduced, defined initiative as "the power
. . . to propose . . additions or amendments to, or the repeal of, rules
. . ." [AB 1001, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, March 17,
1977], the language as finally adopted is consistent with that used in
granting authority to the board of governors [CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§6076.5(a)]. Thus, even though the term "initiative" may be a misnomer
since the voters, who in this case are active members of the bar, do not have
the ultimate authority to approve or disapprove the measure, it appears that
the same expansive powers that have always been vested in the board of
governors to revise and augment the rules of professional conduct have now
been extended to the members of the state bar.
Chapter 478 requires the proponents of an initiative petition to file the text
of the proposed measure both with the secretary of the state bar and with the
clerk of the state supreme court [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6076.5(c)]. The
secretary must then prepare a "true and impartial" summary of the chief
purposes and points of the proposed initiative measure, which the propo-
nents are required to place across the top of each page of the petition on
which signatures are to appear [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6076.5(d),(e)].
Chapter 478 allows 180 days for the petition to be circulated and filed
with the secretary and provides that to qualify for submission to the mem-
bers for a vote, an initiative measure must be signed by at least 20 percent of
the active members from each state bar district [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§6076.5(k), (1)]. While any member of the state bar, or an employee or
agent thereof, may circulate an initiative petition [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§6076.5(i)], only active members [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§6003-
6007 (defines classes of membership)] are entitled to propose a measure or
to sign a petition [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6076.5(b), (h)(4)].
Section 6076.5(m) of the Business and Professions Code provides that if
the requisite number of verified signatures appears on a petition, the secre-
tary must submit the measure within 90 days to all active members of the bar
for a mail vote. If a majority of the active members approve the initiative
measure, it is then submitted to the state supreme court for its consideration
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6076.5(o)].
COMMENT
It is clear that statutory grounds for discipline are not exclusive since the
supreme court retains inherent power to require standards with respect to
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admission to, and practice in, the bar [E.g., Stratmore v. State Bar, 14 Cal.
3d 887, 889, 538 P.2d 229, 230, 123 Cal. Rptr. 101, 102 (1975); Emslie v.
State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 224-25, 520 P.2d 991, 999, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175,
183 (1974)]. Furthermore, the Rules of Professional Conduct supplement
rather than limit or supersede other provisions of law relating to the duties
and obligations of attorneys [Hutchins v. Municipal Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d
77, 89, 132 Cal. Rptr. 158, 166 (1976); RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT OF
STATE BAR 1-100]. Nevertheless, since the court as a matter of policy will
not exercise its inherent powers until the disciplinary powers of the state bar
have been exhausted [In re Walker, 32 Cal. 2d 488, 490, 196 P.2d 882, 883
(1948)], the rules of professional conduct appear to be of primary impor-
tance to the California Bar.
The state bar serves as an arm of the court and assists in matters of
attorney admission and discipline [Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 566, 354 P.2d 637, 645, 7 Cal. Rptr. 109, 117
(1960)]. This status has enabled the state bar to withstand constitutional
attacks on its authority that were based upon claims of legislative infringe-
ment on the powers of the court [See Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287,
300, 368 P.2d 697, 703, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 159 (1962)] and improper
delegation of judicial power [See Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 680,
289 P. 818, 819 (1930); In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 12, 279 P. 998, 1000
(1929)]. The court has noted that the state bar is sui generis; that since it
proceeds as an arm of the court, the legislature had not usurped the judicial
power, in violation of the doctrine of seperation of powers, when it adopted
the statutory scheme [See Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 300, 368
P.2d 697, 703, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 159 (1962)]. The court has also stated
that since the board of governors is not given powers that possess the finality
and effect of judicial orders [In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 12, 279 P. 998,
1000 (1929)], but rather has only the power to propose rules of conduct that
do not become effective until approved by the supreme court, the formula-
tion of such rules by the board of governors is not an improper delegation of
judicial power [See Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 680, 289 P. 818, 819
(1930)].
Since the formulation of rules of professional conduct by active members
of the bar, as provided in Chapter 478, appears to have the same character-
istics as the formulation of such rules by the board of governors, i.e., the
members of the bar would be proceeding as an arm of the court and the rules
proposed by them would not become final until approved by the supreme
court, it would seem that the provisions of Chapter 478 that permit the
proposal of rules of professional conduct by initiative petition should with-
stand a constitutional challenge by employing the same reasoning that has
previously been used to uphold similar activities by the Board of Governors
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of the State Bar of California. Thus, Chapter 478 would appear to provide a
viable alternative by which active members of the bar can expeditiously
make known their thoughts on the present rules of conduct and propose
constructive additions, amendments, or deletions to these governing laws.
See Generally:
1) 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys §§156-191 (regulation of practice,
disciplinary proceedings) (2d ed. 1970), §§157-191 (Supp. 1977).
Business Associations and Professions; discrimination by licensees
Business and Professions Code §125.6 (amended).
AB 779 (Chappie); STATS 1977, Ch 293
Support: California Association of the Physically Handicapped
Opposition: California Association of Realtors
In 1974 the California Legislature subjected all persons licensed under the
provisions of the Business and Professions Code to disciplinary action for
any discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national
origin in the performance of the licensed activity [See CAL. STATS. 1974, c.
1350, §1, at 2930]. Section 125.6 of the Business and Professions Code, as
amended by Chapter 293, now provides that specified licensees under this
code may now be subject to disciplinary action for discriminating against a
person in the performance of a licensed service because of his or her
physicial handicap [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §125.6]. It appears that such
disciplinary action may include the suspension or revocation of a licensee's
license [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§475-492]. For the purposes of
Section 125.6, a "physical handicap" includes "impairment of sight,
hearing, or speech, or impairment of physical ability because of amputation
or loss of function or coordination, or any other health impairment that
requires special education or related services" [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§125.6. See also CAL. LAB. CODE §1413(h)].
Specifically, Chapter 293 now raises the possibility of disciplinary action
if a specified licensee refuses to perform or aids or incites the refusal to
perform a licensed activity, or if he or she discriminates or restricts the
performance of a licensed activity because of an applicant's physical hand-
icap [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6]. Discrimination by licensees under
Section 125.6, however, does not include: (1) employer hiring practices; (2)
discrimination by private clubs holding alcoholic beverage licenses; and (3)
as added by Chapter 293, architectural barriers that conform to state or local
building codes and regulations [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §125.6]. Addi-
tionally, refusal to perform a licensed activity by a person licensed under the
healing arts division of the Business and Professions Code [CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE Division 2 (commencing with §500)] will not constitute dis-
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crimination against a handicapped person if the licensee determines that the
licensed service being requested is beyond his or her skill or "could better
be performed by another licensee" [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §125.6].
Thus, it would appear that a physician or other healing arts professional
could refuse to extend services to a physically handicapped person without
being subject to disciplinary action pursuant to Section 125.6, if the physi-
cian or other professional demonstrates that the service sought was beyond
his or her skill or could better be performed by another professional.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 293, Section 125.6 provided for
disciplinary action if the licensee made any discrimination, distinction, or
restriction based on race, color, sex, etc. [CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1350, §1, at
2930]. Chapter 293 amends Section 125.6 to eliminate the word "distinc-
tion" as a proscribed element for which a licensee can be subject to
disciplinary action [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.6]. It would appear that
the elimination of this word will not affect the operation of Section 125.6
since the definition of the terms "distinction" and "discrimination" would
appear to be essentially synonymous in proscribing activity that would
constitute a difference of treatment of a certain class of persons [See
MERIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648, 659 (unabridged
3rd ed. 1976)].
Discrimination against the physically handicapped is statutorily dis-
couraged in the area of employment opportunities [See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1412] and in the area of access to public places and housing accommoda-
tions [See CAL. Civ. CODE §§54-55.1]. Thus, through the enactment of
Chapter 293, the California Legislature would appear to be continuing a
policy of extending statutory protection to certain rights and privileges of the
physically handicapped.
See Generally:
1) 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 158 (discrimination by
licensees) (1975).
2) 6 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 377 (right of access to
public places and housing accommodations for handicapped persons) (1975).
3) 5 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1973 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 405 (proscribing dis-
crimination against handicapped persons for employment opportunities) (1974).
Business Associations and Professions; healing arts---excessive
treatment as unprofessional conduct
Business and Professions Code §§2361.5, 3108 (repealed); §700 (new);
§§1680, 2660, 2690 (amended).
AB 722 (Duffy); STATS 1977, Ch 509
Support: Board of Medical Quality Assurance; California Attorney
General
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Prior to the enactment of Chapter 509, the excessive prescribing or
administering of drugs or treatment, use of diagnostic procedures, or use of
diagnostic or treatment facilities constituted unprofessional conduct by phy-
sicians, surgeons, osteopaths, dentists, podiatrists, physical therapists, psy-
chologists, and optometrists if such treatment was shown to be "clearly
excessive," as determined by the customary practice and standards of the
local community of the licensee and was detrimental to the patient [See,
e.g., CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 546, §4, at 1354; CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1318,
§§2, 4, at 2455-56]. Not specifically regulated under the prior law, howev-
er, was the professional conduct of chiropractors in matters concerning
excessive treatment [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §1000-1010]. In addi-
tion, the law previously prescribed specific sanctions for excessive or
unnecessary treatment that consituted unprofessional conduct, which in-
cluded suspension or revocation of the professional license or the imposition
of probationary conditions [See, e.g., CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 757, §9, at
1366; CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1318, §1, at 2454-55].
Chapter 509 adds Section 700 to the Business and Professions Code,
which now defines as unprofessional conduct "repeated acts of clearly
excessive" prescribing, or administering drugs or treatment, use of diag-
nostic procedures, or use of diagnostic or treatment facilities "as determined
by the standard of the local community of licensees." Although Chapter 509
repeals the former prohibitions and specific sanctions against such conduct
[See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§1680, 2660, 2690, as amended, CAL.
STATS. 1977, c. 509, §§3, 6, 7, at -]. Section 700 specifically provides
that the conduct described in that section is unprofessional for physicians,
surgeons, dentists, podiatrists, psychologists, physical therapists, optome-
trists, and chiropractors. Besides consolidating the provisions proscribing
excessive treatment by professionals in the healing arts, Chapter 509 also
makes two substantive changes in the description of this type of unprofes-
sional conduct. First, as a precondition to any disciplinary action the new
law now requires the complainant to show that the conduct of the particular
professional consisted of "repeated acts of clearly excessive" treatment
rather than simply to show that such conduct was "clearly excessive," as
was the case under the old law [Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §700
with CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 546, §4, at 1353 and CAL. STATS. 1970, c.
1318, §§2, 4, at 2455-56]. Furthermore, Chapter 509 eliminates the require-
ment established under the prior law that the results of such excessive
treatment must be detrimental to the patient before the conduct may be
declared unprofessional [Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §700 with
CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 546, §4, at 1353 and CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1318,
§§2, 4, 5, at 2455-57]. Section 700 of the Business and Professions Code,
however, does not specify the sanctions that may be imposed against
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professionals in the healing arts for this type of unprofessional conduct. It
would appear, therefore, that disciplinary action against such individuals
must be governed by the general prohibitions against unprofessional conduct
[See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§1670, 2360, 2660] or by the
governing boards of the individual professions [See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§1000-1010, 2960(h)].
Finally, by eliminating the requirement that excessive treatment be detri-
mental to the patient before it may constitute unprofessional conduct, the
effect of Chapter 509 appears to be a strengthening of 1970 legislation
enacted to discourage excessive and unnecessary treatment by members of
the healing arts [Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §700 with CAL. STATS.
1970, c. 1318, §§2, 4, at 2455-56]. This original legislation, on the other
hand, may have been weakened by Chapter 509 in the sense that a com-
plainant must now show repeated acts of excessive treatment before con-
duct may be declared unprofessional, while before a practitioner could be
accused on the basis of a single instance of excessive treatment if it was
detrimental to the patient [Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §700 with
CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1318, §§2, 4, at 2455-56]. Nevertheless, it would
appear that Chapter 509 may strengthen the laws deterring excessive or
unnecessary treatment by members of specified professions by enabling
injured patients and the governing boards of these professions to more easily
establish the fact of such unprofessional conduct.
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